Abstract
The British way of using military force to preserve civil order remained remarkably unsystematic for two centuries after the first Riot Act. During that time almost no official effort was made to relate the disparate notions of ‘disturbance’, ‘tumult’, ‘riot’ and ‘disorder’ into a coherent concept of emergency. Indeed, it may be that such coherence was more or less consciously resisted as alien to the English legal and administrative mind alike. In the later nineteenth century the common-law rule of strict necessity — that the executive had the duty to repel force with force, but with only the precise amount of force necessary — was buttressed for another generation by Dicey’s persuasive formulations.1 The deliberate imprecision of the legal view was highlighted by the Liberal lawyer-statesman R. B. Haldane (then Secretary of State for War, later Lord Chancellor) in his evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on the Employment of Military in Cases of Disturbance in 1908. The law, he said, rested on the judgment of each officer charged with preservation of the peace, who had to tread a narrow path between two precipices — ‘he has to get along and he does get along’.2
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Notes
Charles Townshend, ‘Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in Britain and the Empire, 1800–1940’, Historical Journal, vol. 25, no. 1 (1982) p. 175.
L. Radzinowicz, A History of the English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750 (London, 1968) vol. IV, p. 151.
Jane Morgan, Conflict and Order. The Police and Industrial Disputes in England and Wales 1900–1939 (Oxford, 1987) p. 46.
General Sir C. F. N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life (London, 1924) vol. I, p. 138.
Capt. K. O. Fox, ‘The Tonypandy Riots’, Army Quarterly vol. 104, no. 1 (1973) p. 75.
Home Secretary to the King, quoted in R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill (London, 1967) vol. ii, p. 374 (wrongly dated as 10 November);
Cf C. Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars. Counter insurgency in the Twentieth Century (London, 1986) pp. 24–6.
For an analysis of the government’s policy see C. Townshend, ‘Military Force and Civil Authority in Britain and Ireland’, Journal of British Studies, vol. 28, no. 3 (July 1989), pp. 262–92.
D. Ascoli, The Queen’s Peace. The Origins and Development of the Metropolitan Police 1829–1979 (London, 1979) p. 203.
G. W. Reynolds and A. Judge, The Night the Police Went on Strike (London, 1968) passim.
C. Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland. Government and Resistance Since 1948 (Oxford, 1983) pp. 322–56.
C. Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland 1919–1921. The Development of Political and Military Policies (Oxford, 1975) pp. 160–6.
Cf C. Townshend, ‘The Irish Insurgency, 1918–21: The Military Problem’, R. Haycock (ed) Regular Armies and Insurgency (London, 1979) pp. 45–9.
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© 1990 John B. Hattendorf and Malcolm H. Murfett
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Townshend, C. (1990). ‘One Man Whom You Can Hang If Necessary’: The Discreet Charm of Nevil Macready. In: Hattendorf, J.B., Murfett, M.H. (eds) The Limitations of Military Power. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21023-7_6
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