Abstract
A Rockingham-Shelburne ministry was inevitable in 1782 because North’s resignation left the King with no alternative; neither Rockingham nor Shelburne was strong enough alone and the temper of the House was to give up the unequal struggle in America, an attitude which the naval victory at Les Saintes did nothing to alter. Because the Rockingham-Shelburne ministry was in office a peace with America and her allies was inevitable, though in April 1782 Britain mastered her European enemies at sea. But the survival of this new ministry was not inevitable. It was one thing to offer independence, quite another to get both sides of the coalition to agree to the terms under which it should be offered. Even more it was difficult to present peace treaties to Parliament which it would be happy to accept, particularly after victory at sea and in the face of a powerful party still supporting Lord North.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
John Norris, Shelburne and Reform (London, 1963);
I. R. Christie, Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform (London, 1962);
John Cannon, op. cit.; J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: The Years of Acclaim (London, 1969).
A. S. Foord, ‘The Waning of the Influence of the Crown’, English Historical Review, 1947;
B. Kemp, ‘Crewe’s Act, 1782’, English Historical Review, 1953.
Copyright information
© 1990 Keith Perry
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Perry, K. (1990). Rockingham, Shelburne and Peace-Making. In: British Politics and the American Revolution. British History in Perspective. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20931-6_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20931-6_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-40462-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-20931-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)