Physical Reality and Philosophical Ideality

  • T. C. Williams


In continuing the preceding discussion, reference is made here to a passage from Schrödinger that describes the underlying presupposition of the whole scientific enterprise as traditionally conceived — his account of what he calls, the ‘principle of objectivation’ as set out in his Tamer Lectures for 1956:

By this I mean the thing that is also frequently called the ‘hypothesis of the real world’ around us. I maintain that it amounts to a certain simplification which we adopt in order to master the infinitely intricate problem of nature. Without being aware of it and without being rigorously systematic about it, we exclude the Subject of Cognizance from the domain of nature that we endeavour to understand. We step with our own person back into the part of an onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by this very procedure becomes an objective world.1


Physical Reality Pure Reason Copenhagen Interpretation Broad Dimension Causal Issue 
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Copyright information

© T. C. Williams 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • T. C. Williams
    • 1
  1. 1.The University of GuelphCanada

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