Abstract
According to the definition proposed by the Advanced Research Workshop on Modelling and Analysis of Arms Control Problems held in Spitzingsee, in October 1985,1 the strategic situation between two antagonistic parties is considered to be stable if
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neither side feels compelled to react, on an equivalent footing, to changes in the other side’s force posture (for example, inventory increases, modernisation, new options, and doctrinal innovations) in order to maintain its security (Arms Race Stability); and if
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in a given crisis, neither side perceives an advantage from attacking first or, vice versa, both sides consider it more advantageous to react to the other side’s attack (Crisis Stability).
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© 1990 Anders Boserup and Robert Neild
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Huber, R., Hofmann, H. (1990). The Defence Efficiency Hypothesis and Conventional Stability in Europe: Implications for Arms Control. In: Boserup, A., Neild, R. (eds) The Foundations of Defensive Defence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20733-6_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20733-6_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-52999-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-20733-6
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