Security by Buying More of What We Know

Abstract

One obvious way for NATO to counter the threat which it sees from the WTO’s military posture and the size of its forces is to remove troublesome asymmetries directly. If the disparity in tanks — 12 700 for NATO, 18 000 for the WTO — is really dangerous, NATO could buy more tanks. The alliance would not need to buy an equal number of tanks, because even the most pessimistic military force planner must accept the existence of some advantage for the side which is fighting on the defensive which makes a one-for-one ratio unnecessary. The artillery imbalance (3600 NATO: 9500 WTO) could be remedied in the same way.¹ It is worth considering the costs of implementing such an approach in actual money, rather than the more usual and optimistic estimates cast in terms of proportion of GNP, or the required percentage increase in defense budgets. An American M-1 Abrams tank costs approximately $2.2 million.² Suppose NATO decided to increase its tank force by half of the current discrepancy — by buying 2650 new M-1 tanks. The immediate capital cost would be $5.83 billion. A new M-198 howitzer costs the US Army $0.47 million — on the same basis, to make up 50 percent of the disparity between NATO and the WTO would therefore cost $1.387 billion.³ Both of these figures are, of course, merely the initial capital outlay, ignoring the costs of running, maintaining, staffing and ammunition supply.