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Conventional Force Imbalances: The Numbers

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Enhancing European Security

Abstract

Despite our misgivings, it remains necessary to come to some sort of understanding about NATO and WTO force postures, now that the INF Treaty has been ratified and the CFE talks have begun. However, trying to take account of our own concerns about such analyses, we intend to pursue a slightly unusual tack. Instead of predicating our analysis on either the ‘surprise-attack’ or the ‘European deployment’ basis, we shall take the total troop and equipment strength on a full reinforcement basis (as far as this can be calculated from openly available source material). We have also included the full French military structure, rather than omitting it or including only French troops based in West Germany. While this does not factor in any of the full war economy/long war of attrition scenarios, it at least takes the numbers away from NATO’s favorite ‘full surprise/quick war’ analysis, which should no longer be allowed to monopolize our thinking. For the sake of evenhandedness, however, we have not included in NATO’s total the strength of the Spanish armed forces, as the WTO is wont to do. These troops have no role on the central front, and WTO propaganda not withstanding, they are extremely unlikely to show up to defend the Fulda Gap.

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Notes

  1. Barry R. Posen, ‘Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessments’, International Security (Winter 1984–1985), p. 85.

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  2. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: IISS, 1987).

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  3. See Lothar Ruehl, ‘MBFR: Lessons and Problems’, in Jonathan Alford, ed., Arms Control and European Security (New York: St. Martin’s Press for IISS, 1984).

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  4. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).

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  5. Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Gap’, International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50–89. Cohen presents very well the case against thinking the force imbalance is not serious.

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  6. John J. Mearsheimer, in International Security 7, no. 1 (Summer 1982).

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  7. See James F. Dunnigan and William Martel, How to Stop A War (New York: Doubleday, 1987).

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© 1990 Institute for East-West Security Studies

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Cuthbertson, I.M., Robertson, D. (1990). Conventional Force Imbalances: The Numbers. In: Enhancing European Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20682-7_4

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