Abstract
As the Kennedy cabinet’s New Pacific Community discussions stressed, America’s good intentions needed proper direction. Assistance from a friendly foreign power, such as Australia, was encouraged if not demanded. But, a successful direction also depended upon the Kennedy administration’s perception of Asian/Pacific developments. In the case of Micronesia, Kennedy had viewed the islands as a political/cultural whole. Statehood was their destiny, and no further conclusions were necessary. Kennedy had proven the old political dictum that perceptions of the truth in politics can be more important than truth itself. The dictum was applied to Australia as well. Kennedy’s perception of Australian politics, and what America must do to influence them, did nothing for warm Australian-American relations.1
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Notes and References
The struggle to maintain Australian “identity” in the face of America’s “world interests” is a major focus of Trevor Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, 1941–68 (London, 1969). State Department memorandum: “Status and Atmosphere of U.S.-Australian Relations,” February 23 1961, JFK Library, POF/Box 111.
Ibid. Kennedy once noted that Laos was “a symbolic test of strengths between the major powers of the West and the Communist bloc.” He perceived American weakness there as not only requiring stronger policies in Vietnam, but a tightening of anti-communist missions around the world. The Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam (Boston, 1971), Vol. II, pp. 22, 33, 48–49.
J. Wilcynski, “Australia’s Trade With China,” India Quarterly (April–June 1965), pp. 154–167; State Department memorandum: “Communist China and Australia,” Februuary 23, 1961, and Prime Minister Menzies’ visit, February 1961, JFK Library, POF/Box 111; Harry G. Gelber, Australia, Britain and the EEC, 1961–1963 (Melbourne, 1966), p. 47.
The inability, or refusal, of the Kennedy administration to understand the Cold War positions of so-called “little states” is noted in Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, The United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New York, 1985), p. 112.
State Department memo: Status of US-Australian relations, November 1963, ibid. Current scholarship on the Diem coup places greater blame on Kennedy than ever before, but also examines the significance of Kennedy’s personal disgust for the event. See Rust: Kennedy in Vietnam. The importance of family, honor, and commitment was a legacy left by Joseph P. Kennedy to his children. The relevance of that legacy to policy-making is noted in Edward M. Kennedy (ed.), The Fruitful Bough: A Tribute to Joseph P. Kennedy (private publication, 1966), JFK Library.
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© 1990 Timothy P. Maga
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Maga, T.P. (1990). Friend or Foe? Australia and Destiny. In: John F. Kennedy and the New Pacific Community, 1961–63. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20660-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20660-5_3
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