Abstract
While the terms ‘crisis prevention’ and ‘crisis resolution’ are frequently encountered in the Soviet international relations literature, one finds there no term corresponding to ‘crisis management’. ‘Crisis management’ is a concept which was elaborated in the 1960s by US civilian strategists concerned with the manipulation of military ‘signals’ in crises to achieve favourable outcomes without falling over the brink of war. This whole approach to crisis as a special coercive form of diplomatic intercourse is rejected by all Soviet analysts as unrealistic, metaphysical and provocative. To see why this is so and to grasp the nature of the Soviet approach, we must first clarify the meaning of ‘crisis’ in its Soviet, as opposed to American, usage.
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Notes
Special ridicule is reserved for the 44-rung escalation ladder proposed by Herman Kahn, On Escalation — Metaphors and Scenarios, London, Pall Mall Press, 1965.
See S. Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament — Explorations in Soviet Ideology, Chatham House Paper 37, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1987
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© 1990 Carl G. Jacobsen
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Shenfield, S. (1990). Crisis Management: the Soviet Approach. In: Jacobsen, C.G. (eds) Strategic Power: USA/USSR. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20574-5_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20574-5_18
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-52567-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-20574-5
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