Abstract
The idea of stability as a goal of strategic policy is now well established. The term is often prefaced with ‘crisis’ or ‘arms race’ or ‘strategic’ to indicate different types of stability, but the underlying idea is the same in each case — the idea of a military relationship between two antagonistic states or groups of states that does not in itself aggravate the antagonism. A state of strategic stability occurs when there is no premium attached to the initiation of hostilities even in an intense crisis. Military forces need not force the pace — allowing time for diplomacy to produce a settlement.
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Notes
See, for example, Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1984.
For background see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, London, Macmillan, 1981
Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York, Wiley, 1957.
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, New York, Oxford University Press, 1960.
Robert S. McNamara, The Essense of Security: Reflections in Office, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1968.
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© 1990 Carl G. Jacobsen
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Freedman, L. (1990). Strategic Stability/ Superiority: the US View. In: Jacobsen, C.G. (eds) Strategic Power: USA/USSR. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20574-5_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20574-5_15
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-52567-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-20574-5
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