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Anglo-Italian Rivalry in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1935–1940

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Paths to War

Abstract

So, in November 1936, did Benito Mussolini capture the essence of Anglo — Italian rivalry. Italy, its shores totally enclosed by the Mediterranean, was yet denied the dominance of that sea by Britain, who controlled both exits, Gibraltar in the west, Suez in the east. This study will seek first to define Italian and British interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East; to examine how their rivalry developed, especially during the Italo — Ethiopian war; to explore the search for a modus vivendi in the later 1930s; to compare their opposing military strategies; and finally to summarize the events and reasons leading to the extension of the war in Europe to the Mediterranean and Middle East in the summer of 1940.

‘If for others the Mediterranean is a route, for us Italians it is life’

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Notes and References

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Authors

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Robert Boyce Esmonde M. Robertson

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© 1989 Steven Morewood

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Morewood, S. (1989). Anglo-Italian Rivalry in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1935–1940. In: Boyce, R., Robertson, E.M. (eds) Paths to War. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20333-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20333-8_6

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-37518-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-20333-8

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