Abstract
The title ‘cooperative games’ would be better termed games in coalitional form. The theory of games originally developed different conceptual forms, together with their associated solution concepts, namely, games in extensive form, in strategic form and in coalitional form (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). The game in strategic form is sometimes referred to as the game in normal form, while that in coalitional form is also referred to as the game in characteristic form.
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© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Shubik, M. (1989). Cooperative Games. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_8
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