Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Repeated Games

  • Chapter
Book cover Game Theory

Part of the book series: The New Palgrave

Abstract

Repeated game is a generic name for any model where players take simultaneous actions alternately and then a lottery, depending on those actions and the current state of nature, selects jointly a new state of nature, and a private signal and current payoff for each player. Players are interested in some long-term average of the payoffs.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Bibliography

  • Akerlof, G. 1970. The market for `lemons’, qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.J. 1974. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 67–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.J. 1985. Repeated games. In Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, ed. G.R. Feiwel, London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.J. and Hart, S. 1986. Bi-convexity and bi-martingales. Israel Journal of Mathematics 54, 159–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.J. and Maschler, M. 1968. Repeated games of incomplete information: the zero-sum extensive case. In Mathematica (Report to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), ST-143, ch. I II, 37–116 (prepared by Mathematica Inc., Princeton).

    Google Scholar 

  • Bewley, T. and Kohlberg, E. 1976a. The asymptotic theory of stochastic games. Mathematics of Operations Research 1, 197–208.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bewley, T. and Kohlberg, E. 1976b. The asymptotic solution of a recursion equation occurring in the stochastic games. Mathematics of Operations Research 1, 321–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bewley, T. and Kohlberg, E. 1978. On stochastic games with stationary optimal strategies. Mathematics of Operations Research 3, 104–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forges, F. 1982. Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals. International Journal of Game Theory 11, 203–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forges, F. 1984a. A note on Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory 13, 179–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forges, F. 1984b. Communication equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information. CORE Discussion Papers 8406, 8411, 8412, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forges, F. 1986. An approach to communication equlibria. Econometrica 54 (6), 1375–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi, J.C. 1967–8. Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players. Management Science 14, Pt I, 159–82; Pt II, 320–34; Pt III, 486–502.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, S. 1985. Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information. Mathematics of Operations Research 10, 117–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kohlberg, E. 1975. Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory 4, 7–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mertens, J.-F. 1972. The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games: the extensive-case. International Journal of Game Theory 1, 217–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mertens, J.-F. 1982. Repeated games: an overview of the zero-sum case. In Advances in Economic Theory, ed. W. Hildenbrand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mertens, J.-F. and Neyman, A. 1981. Stochastic games. International Journal of Game Theory 10 (2), 53–6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mertens, J.-F. and Parthasarathy, T. 1986. Existence and characterization of Nash equilibria for discounted stochastic games. CORE Discussion Paper, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mertens, J.-F. and Zamir, S. 1980. Minmax and maxmin of repeated games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory 9, 201–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. 1984. Price and advertising signals of product quality. Mimeo, Stanford University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sorin, S. 1986. Asymptotic properties of a non-zero sum stochastic game. International Journal of Game Theory 15, 101–7.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spence, M. 1974. Market Signalling. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Jean-François Mertens
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

John Eatwell Murray Milgate Peter Newman

Copyright information

© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Mertens, JF. (1989). Repeated Games. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_24

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation