Game Theory pp 178-184 | Cite as

Noncooperative Games

  • Joseph E. HarringtonJr
Part of the The New Palgrave book series

Abstract

Game theory analyses multi-agent situations in which the payoff to an agent is dependent not only upon his own actions but also on the actions of others. Zero-sum games assume that the payoffs to the players always sum to zero. In that case, the interests of the players are diametrically opposed. In non-zero-sum games, there is typically room for cooperation as well as conflict.

Keywords

Nash Oligopoly 

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph E. HarringtonJr

There are no affiliations available

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