Game Theory pp 54-67 | Cite as


  • John C. Harsanyi
Part of the The New Palgrave book series


By bargaining we mean negotiations between two or more parties about the terms of possible cooperation, which may involve trade, employment (collective bargaining), a joint business venture, etc. For lack of space we will only discuss bargaining between two parties, and will restrict ourselves to the case of complete information. (For n-person bargaining, see Harsanyi, 1977, chs 10 to 13; for the case of incomplete information, see Harsanyi, 1982, and Harsanyi and Selten, 1987).


Nash Solution Utility Outcome Utility Vector Bargaining Situation Monotonicity Axiom 
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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1989

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  • John C. Harsanyi

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