By bargaining we mean negotiations between two or more parties about the terms of possible cooperation, which may involve trade, employment (collective bargaining), a joint business venture, etc. For lack of space we will only discuss bargaining between two parties, and will restrict ourselves to the case of complete information. (For n-person bargaining, see Harsanyi, 1977, chs 10 to 13; for the case of incomplete information, see Harsanyi, 1982, and Harsanyi and Selten, 1987).
KeywordsNash Solution Utility Outcome Utility Vector Bargaining Situation Monotonicity Axiom
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