Solipsism Overcome

Abstract

K’s case for solipsism is a formidable one. But, as we shall see, it can be overthrown by some of the considerations set out earlier in the book.

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This explication does not logically entail that I am veridically perceiving X at place P. For X-at-P might, for example, cause a hypnotist to be causally necessary and sufficient for my seeming perception. However, I find that I can be justified in affirming the system of best explanations discussed above if and only if I hold that, at least for the most part, when it is rational for me to believe that X-at-P is a cause of my seeming perception, then it is rational for me to believe that this is not because X-at-P is a cause of a hallucination-producing cause of my seeming perception. for an attempt to provide a plausible, fully fledged causal analysis of veridical perception — i.e. logically sufficient and necessary conditions for veridical perception — see H. P. Grice, ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 35 (1961) 143–4.
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Authors

Clement Dore
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Dore, C. (1989). Solipsism Overcome. In: God, Suffering and Solipsism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20047-4_9

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20047-4_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-20049-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-20047-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)