The Free-Will Defence, II

Abstract

Another version of the free-will defence — called the’ soul-making theodicy’ by its most eloquent and able defender, John Hick¹ — can be stated as follows. We do not have to view all suffering as the result of sin, since free virtuous responses to suffering are sufficiently valuable to outweigh the negative value of the suffering. Indeed, God may well be the ultimate author of suffering. God’s causing suffering is compatible with his omnipotence cum perfect goodness, since (1) free virtuous responses to suffering are of great value and (2) not even an omnipotent being could make free virtuous responses to suffering possible if suffering did not exist. Moreover, God’s permitting people not to respond virtuously with respect to some instances of suffering is compatible with his omnipotence cum perfect goodness, since not even an omnipotent being could cause people to exhibit free virtuous responses. (This latter thesis makes the soul-making theodicy a version of the free-will defence.)