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The Free-Will Defence, I

  • Clement Dore

Abstract

Let us now consider the most formidable argument against God’s existence, the atheistic argument from suffering: ‘An omnipotent being would have the power to abolish suffering and a perfectly good being would abolish it; hence, no being is both omnipotent and perfectly good, i.e. a maximally great being does not exist.’ In view of M1, A and O, we have reason to believe that this argument is unsound. However, as we shall see, it is no simple matter to discover just what is wrong with it.

Keywords

Free Choice Natural Evil Perfect Person Transworld Depravity Incompatibility Thesis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 3.
    J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 174.Google Scholar
  2. 4.
    Flew and MacIntyre, New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955) pp. 149–51.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Clement Dore 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Clement Dore
    • 1
  1. 1.Vanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA

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