Abstract
The supremely perfect being of the last chapter is, of course, identical with the maximally great being of Chapter 1. Hence, the former would be necessarily absolutely great, i.e. no other supremely perfect being is possible.
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Notes
In formulating this explanation, I have drawn on Rowe’s critique of Anselm’s Proslogion II argument in Rowe’s Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson, 1978) pp. 41–6.
Clement Dore, Theism (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984) p. 98.
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© 1989 Clement Dore
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Dore, C. (1989). Parodies. In: God, Suffering and Solipsism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20047-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20047-4_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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