Round Two in the Middle East: the Suez War

  • Evan Luard

Abstract

The armistice agreements the United Nations helped to negotiate in 1949 between Israel and the Arab states had not brought peace to the area. The instability that had been so evident in 1949–50 (Volume 1, pp. 204–6) increased rather than diminished with time. Egypt did not relax her blockade of Israel, nor her refusal to allow Israeli ships and cargoes to proceed through the Suez Canal, despite the Security Council resolution to that effect. The Tripartite Declaration (under which Britain, France and the US had guaranteed the status quo in 1950) may have inhibited major efforts to overturn the settlement, at least over the short term; but it did nothing to pacify the frontiers themselves. And those frontiers, especially that between Israeli and Egyptian (or rather Egyptian-occupied)* territory at Gaza, became progressively more disturbed.

Keywords

Shipping Syria Explosive Assure Expense 

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Notes

  1. 1.
    For an account of these problems see E. H. Hutchinson, Violent Truce (New York, 1956)Google Scholar
  2. E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (New York, 1963)Google Scholar
  3. and C. Von Horn, Soldiering for Peace (London, 1966).Google Scholar
  4. 2.
    For a more general study of the armistices, see David Brook, Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System (Washington, D.C., 1964).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    A. Nutting, No End of a Lesson (London, 1967) p. 140.Google Scholar
  6. 9.
    Hammarskjöld was still hoping to persuade Israel to allow the force to operate on her side of the border until the late summer of 1957 (see Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, London, 1972, p. 226).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Evan Luard 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Evan Luard

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