The Trouble Model

Abstract

Contradictions and misconceptions within ‘symbolic interactionism’s’ (particularly the labelling approach’s) model of deviance frequently help to clarify the phenomenological stance. For instance, Pollner (1974) shows that Becker (1963), although denying intrinsic validity of stigmatising labels, creates the category of ‘secret deviance’ and thus implicitly admits that acts may be deemed deviant by rule violators not (yet) blamed by others. This, argues Pollner, documents that deviance is as much a members’ category as it is one of official agents. In the same vein, R. Emerson (1973) maintains that the sequence that residual rule-breaking precedes identification of deviance, particularly mental illness, need not always apply. In the case of mass murder, he says, initially this may not be seen as a rule violation at all, ‘yet questions of mental illness are almost inevitably raised in such cases’ (1973, p. 7). Moreover, Emerson goes on to say, the relationships between an act (‘violation’) and the rule of which it is a violation is far from fixed: ‘Consider the act of “shoplifting” as managed in the juvenile court: committed by an upper middle class youth, this offense often indicates mental illness to court personnel; yet the “same act” committed by a lower class youngster is typically seen as a minor, crime-like delinquency’ (1973,p. 8).