SALT’S Side–Effects, 1973–74

Abstract

It was no mean achievement for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree upon the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems and the limitation of nuclear missiles in May 1972. However, the West Europeans were always nervous that the US-Soviet détente might evolve into a US-Soviet entente and at the expense of their own security. Indeed these fears were taken sufficiently seriously in Washington for the US Government to take measures to reassert the unalterability of the US commitment to the common defence. The means by which this was done necessarily exacerbated differences with the Russians over the negotiating agenda at SALT II. For the United States sought to reassure its West European allies by focusing on the utility of US forward-based systems which so much concerned the Soviet military. The renewed focus on this US capability naturally reinforced the concern of the Soviet military to reduce this asset through negotiation or, if this proved impossible, to negate the value of this capability through the deployment of countervailing forces by the Soviet Union.