Introduction

Abstract

There is a long history of opposition between psychology, both in its academic and (to a lesser extent) its clinical forms, and psychoanalysis. This has some of its roots in the automatic antagonism between two disciplines that are contesting the same field — in this case, explanations of human behaviour. But it also reflects a polarity in the philosophical bases and empirical procedures characteristic of the two enterprises. Psychologists have adopted a model for their discipline which is founded on the example of the natural sciences. Emphasis is placed on the careful collection of observational data, the generation of hypotheses that involve operational concepts and measurable predictions, and the design and implementation of experimental procedures for use with human ‘subjects’ that emulate the arrangements governing laboratory investigations of non-human phenomena. Theorising is related to testable hypotheses; experiments are approved to the extent that they employ appropriately sampled and numerous populations of study, objective assessment procedures and clearly defined interventions with specific effects, with all extraneous influences ‘controlled’. Although it is recognised that there is a place for other modes of investigation, such as naturalistic observations and single case experimental designs, these are regarded either as precursors of proper experimental work, or as second-best substitutes when full experimental control is impossible.