Palestine and the British Experience of Counter-Insurgency
T. E. Lawrence’s wry observation on the Turkish predicament in the First World War has proven timeless in its relevance to armies in counter-insurgency, and no more so than for the British in Palestine. Counter-insurgency is ‘messy and slow’; success requires skill and perseverance, both political and military. The evidence presented suggests that the British campaign lacked these essential qualities. It also indicates some reasons why this was the case. In these lie the answers to the two questions posed at the outset of this study.
KeywordsOperational Policy Security Force British Government Insurgent Group Army Officer
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