Causation

Abstract

We use principles of causation in everyday thought and action, whether playing a game, gardening or mending the car. The principles of causation are needed in the law (not only the criminal law) as well. When can it be said that a particular event was caused by a particular action? The need for rules of causation in the criminal law can be approached from two directions. From the point of view of the actor or the accused we may ask, for which consequences of his actions will he be held liable? At some point in the chain of events that stretches from a single action, the law will have to draw a line, beyond which there is no criminal liability. Alternatively, one may start from the event, which as a ‘consequence’ forms part of the actus reus of a crime, such as serious injury, the death of a person, or damage to property. The law needs to be able to point to one or more actors who by their actions ‘caused’ the result. Each of these points of view demonstrates the close links between mens rea and causation in arriving at an answer to the question: who is liable? Mens rea provides, as we have seen, a limitation of liability based on the accused’s state of mind: the accused will only be liable for a result if he possesses the required mens rea, usually intention or recklessness, in respect of that result. In its approach to causation the law asks questions such as ‘what would a reasonable person have foreseen?’ in order to set a limit to liability. And yet, the principles of causation are not redundant. They are useful not only in the case of offences which do not require mens rea in respect of the relevant consequence, but also as an important additional method of setting a limit to criminal liability.