The debates about the continental commitment and a maritime strategy are closely related to the question of whether priority should be given to European or global defence. Maritime forces designed to help defend the Channel and the Eastern Atlantic can also be used to promote and protect British (and Western) interests outside the European theatre. In an important sense, part of the controversy between land-air and sea-air contributions to European defence has focused on the wider question of intervention capabilities for national and alliance purposes outside the European theatre.
KeywordsEurope Expense Hull Argentina Defend
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Notes and References
- 1.See in particular A. Verrier, Through the Looking Glass: British Foreign Policy in the Age of Illusions ( London: Jonathan Cape, 1983 )Google Scholar
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- 12.R. Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1968 ), pp. 263–4.Google Scholar
- 22.J. Wyllie, The Influence of British Arms: An Analysis of British Military Intervention Since 1956 ( London: Allen & Unwin 1984 ), p. 106.Google Scholar