The Continental Commitment Versus a Maritime Strategy

Abstract

One of the most important issues in British defence policy in the late 1980s is the debate between those supporting a continentalist strategy and those advocating more emphasis on Britain’s maritime contribution to the defence of Western Europe and beyond. As the Introduction has attempted to show this is hardly a new controversy. The dialectic between the maritime school and their continental opponents has been a continuous theme in the history of British defence policy over the centuries, including the first part of the twentieth century. As Michael Howard and Brian Bond have shown, the debate was particularly significant during the period leading up to the Second World War.¹ For much of the inter-war period British governments remained extremely reluctant to make any formal commitment to the defence of Western Europe. The priority given to imperial defence meant that the Chiefs of Staff were only prepared to accept a ‘limited liability’ in Europe. As the situation in Europe deteriorated in the late 1930s, however, the government’s dilemma sharpened. In December 1937, the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, presented a list of defence priorities to his Cabinet colleagues in which the continental commitment ranked last.² By March 1939 events in Europe forced the Chiefs of Staff to carry out a remarkable volte-face.