Abstract
While there are doubts about the ability of a non-nuclear defence policy to cope with nuclear blackmail there are even greater problems about the military effectiveness of such a strategy. Indeed in part the two difficulties are related. If the strategy is seen to be militarily suspect (as will be suggested here) then the chances of nuclear blackmail being used (successfully) will be increased.
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Notes
John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence ( Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983 ), pp. 19–20.
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© 1989 Ken Booth and John Baylis
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Booth, K., Baylis, J. (1989). The Military Problems of Non-Nuclear Strategies. In: Britain, NATO and Nuclear Weapons. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19667-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19667-8_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-43404-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-19667-8
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