Skip to main content

The Crisis of Empire, 1945–48

  • Chapter
Britain and Decolonisation

Part of the book series: The Making of the 20th Century ((MACE))

  • 91 Accesses

Abstract

It was inevitable that the British should have found the aftermath of the war a period of intense strain in the organisation and defence of their worldwide interests. With their economic resources stretched beyond their limit, new commitments at home and abroad and a lowering international landscape, it required strong nerves to be the landlord of so much far-flung, ill-defended and turbulent real estate. But the years beteen 1945 and 1948 were not simply a phase of anxiety and overload in the management of the imperial system. They formed a critical turning point in Britain’s post-war career as an international power. In these years the rough outline of Britain’s last phase as an imperial power took shape; the commitments which dictated her foreign policy until the late 1960s were established; and their validity recognised by the main body of political opinion at home. By 1948 most, though not all, of the huge uncertainties of 1945 had begun to clear away.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and References

  1. See his remarkable letter to Attlee, 1 Jan. 1947, PREM 8/564, Public Record Office.

    Google Scholar 

  2. P. S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement 1914–1964 (London 1975) pp. 250, 260, 265.

    Google Scholar 

  3. J. R. Seeley, The expansion of England first published in 1883.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Described by Cripps as ‘socialist democracy’. E. Estorick, Stafford Cripps (London, 1949) p. 360.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Cabinet 16 (1946) 18 Feb. 1946, CAB 128/5.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Cabinet 54 (1946) 3 June 1946, CAB 128/5.

    Google Scholar 

  7. R. Clarke, Anglo-American economic collaboration in war and peace 1942–1949, ed. A. Cairncross (Oxford, 1982), p. 72–4.

    Google Scholar 

  8. H. Dalton, High tide and after: memoirs 1945–1960 (London, 1962) pp. 170–1.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Note by Lord President of the Council, C.P. (47) 20, 7 Jan. 1947, CAB 129/16.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Memo by Chancellor of Exchequer 13 Jan. 1947, Cabinet Defence Committee D. O. (47) 9.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Dalton, High tide, pp. 193–8.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Dalton’s Cabinet memos 21 Mar. and 28 May 1947 are printed in Clarke, Economic collaboration.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Ibid., p. 180. Memo by RWB Clarke, 23 July 1947.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Dalton, High tide, p. 259.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Ibid., pp. 241–4.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Cabinet 78 (47) 2 Oct. 1947, CAB 128/10.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Memo by Chancellor of Exchequer, C.P. (48) 35, 5 Feb. 1948, CAB 129/24.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Memo by prime minister, C.P. (45) 44, 1 Sept 1945, CAB 129/1.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Dalton, High tide, p. 101.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Ibid., p. 105.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  22. The memoirs of F. M. The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (Companion book club edn, London, 1958) p. 400.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Memo by Chiefs of Staff, ‘the defence of the Commonwealth’, 7 Mar. 1947, D.O. (47) 23, CAB 131/4.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Defence Committee 9 (48), 30 April 1948, CAB 131/5.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 444.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Memo by Minister of Defence, C.P. (48) 2, 24 Dec. 1947, CAB 129/23.

    Google Scholar 

  27. M. Gowing, Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy 1945–52 (London, 1974) vol. I, pp. 184–5.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  28. C.P. (47) 11, 3 Jan. 1947, CAB 129/16.

    Google Scholar 

  29. The development of British policy in this period can be followed in: A Seal, ‘Imperialism and nationalism in India’, Modern Asian Studies VII, 3 (1973) pp. 321–47;

    Google Scholar 

  30. D. A. Washbrook, The emergence of provincial politics (Cambridge 1976);

    Book  Google Scholar 

  31. C. A. Bayly, The local roots of Indian politics (Oxford, 1975);

    Google Scholar 

  32. B. R. Tomlinson, The political economy of the raj 1914–47 (London, 1979).

    Google Scholar 

  33. For British policy and Indian nationalism in the inter-war years: J. Gallagher and A. Seal, ‘Britain and India between the wars’, Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3 (1981) pp. 387–414;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. B. R. Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj: the penultimate phase (London, 1976);

    Google Scholar 

  35. R. J. Moore, The crisis of Indian unity (Oxford, 1974);

    Google Scholar 

  36. R. Coupland, The constitutional problem in India (Madras, 1945).

    Google Scholar 

  37. See J. O. Rawson, ‘The role of India in imperial defence beyond Indian frontiers and home waters’, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

  38. The hope of Lord Irwin, Viceroy 1926–31. See C. Bridge ‘Conservatism and Indian reform 1929–1939’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History IV, 2 (1976), p. 183.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Gallagher and Seal, ‘Britain and India’, p. 408.

    Google Scholar 

  40. See C. J. Baker, Politics in South India 1920–1937 (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 53–4.

    Google Scholar 

  41. For Irwin’s views, G. Peele, ‘A note on the Irwin declaration’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History I, 3 (1973), pp. 331–7;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. for that of the Chiefs of Staff in March 1946, N. Mansergh (ed.), The transfer of power 1942–7 (T.P.) V, (London, 1976) pp. 1166–73.

    Google Scholar 

  43. For the view that the Cripps offer was undermined by Churchill and the viceroy, R. J. Moore, Escape from empire (Oxford, 1983), p. 12.

    Google Scholar 

  44. G. Rizvi, Linlithgow and India (London, 1978), pp. 206–7.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Ibid., pp. 237–9. For Attlee’s view, in October 1942, Moore, Escape from empire, p. 4.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Thus the governor of one province told the Viceroy in November 1945 that he had 17 European (i.e. white) civil servants and 19 police officers for 18,000,000 people and 100,000 square miles. Twynam to Wavell, 26 Nov. 1945, T.P. VI, p. 543.

    Google Scholar 

  47. See C.P. (45) 137, 30 Aug. 1945, T.P. VI, p. 181.

    Google Scholar 

  48. P. Moon, Wavell: the Viceroy’s Journal (London, 1973) pp. 165–9.

    Google Scholar 

  49. Cabinet 24 (45) 20 Aug. 1945, CAB 128/1; Cabinet India and Burma Committee (I.B.C.) 4 Sept. 1945, T.P. VI, pp. 211–12.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Ibid.; Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 5 Aug. 1945, T.P. VI, pp. 28–30; memo by Cripps, 3 Sept. 1945, T.P. VI, pp. 203–4.

    Google Scholar 

  51. See note by Cabinet Far East Civil Planning Unit, 14 Jan. 1946, T.P. VI, pp. 780–2; note by Pethick-Lawrence on draft Anglo-Indian treaty, 23 Feb, 1946, T.P. VI, p. 1051 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  52. Chequers discussion, 24 Feb. 1946: Cripps’ draft directions for cabinet delegation to India. T.P. VI, pp. 1058, 1062.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Note by Far East Civil Planning Unit, 14 Jan. 1946; draft statement of Indian economic policy, n.d., T.P. VI, pp. 1035–7.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Hollis to Monteath, 13 Mar. 1946, giving views of Chiefs of Staff. T.P. VI, pp. 1167–73.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 Dec. 1945, T.P. VI, pp. 686–7.

    Google Scholar 

  56. See Nehru’s angry letter to Cripps, 27 Jan. 1946, T.P. VI, pp. 852–8.

    Google Scholar 

  57. See remarks on political opinion in the Punjab in Jenkins to Wavell, 9 May 1946, T.P. VII, p. 484.

    Google Scholar 

  58. Nehru to Cripps, 27 Jan. 1946.

    Google Scholar 

  59. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru vol. 1 1889–1947 (London, 1975) p. 327.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Nehru’s phrase, letter to Cripps, 27 Jan. 1946.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 6 Nov. 1945, T.P. VI, p. 453.

    Google Scholar 

  62. I.B.C. 7 (45) 19 Nov. 1945, T.P. VI, p. 502.

    Google Scholar 

  63. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 Dec. 1945, T.P. VI, p. 688.

    Google Scholar 

  64. Thorne (Home Member, Govt of India) to Abell, 5 April 1946, T.P. VII, p. 151.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Wavell to King George VI, 22 Mar. 1946, T.P. VI, 1233.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Thorne to Abell, 5 April 1946.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Cabinet 55 (46) 5 June 1946, Confidential annex, CAB 128/7.

    Google Scholar 

  68. I.B.C. 1 (46) 14 Jan. 1946, T.P. VI, p. 787.

    Google Scholar 

  69. See e.g. his memo of 18 April 1946, T.P. VII, pp. 303–5.

    Google Scholar 

  70. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  71. See Cabinet Delegation to Attlee, 8 May 1946, T.P. VII, p. 455; Moore, Escape from empire, pp. 106–7.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Moon, Wavell, pp. 370–4. ‘I cannot carry Bengal for more than another twelve months’, its governor told Wavell. Ibid. p. 370.

    Google Scholar 

  73. I.B.C. 8 (46) 11 Dec. 1946, T.P. IX, p. 332 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  74. For Wavell’s plan as presented to ministers in a note dated 3 Nov. 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 386 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  75. I.B.C. 13 (46) 20 Dec. 1946, T.P. IX, pp. 391–4.

    Google Scholar 

  76. Cabinet 108 (46) 31 Dec. 1946, Confidential annex, T.P. IX, pp. 427–31.

    Google Scholar 

  77. See notes by Attlee, n.d. but c. 14 Nov. 1946; Wavell’s comment, Moon, Wavell, p. 398.

    Google Scholar 

  78. See note 69.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  80. Bevin to Attlee, 1 Jan. 1947, PREM 8/564.

    Google Scholar 

  81. Moore, Escape from empire, p. 220; Cabinet 21 (47) 13 Feb. 1947, Confidential annex, CAB 128/10.

    Google Scholar 

  82. Attlee to Mountbatten, 18 Feb. 1947, T.P. IX, pp. 972–4.

    Google Scholar 

  83. Viceroy’s personal report no. 1, 2 April 1947, CAB 127/111 (Sir Stafford Cripps papers).

    Google Scholar 

  84. The provincial assemblies were to decide between partition and unity. Mountbatten thought there was an ‘outside chance’ that Bengal would vote for unity and independence. Viceroy’s personal report 5, 1 May 1947.

    Google Scholar 

  85. But see the discussion in Moore, Escape from empire, pp. 234–280, which suggests that Mountbatten himself was confused and uncertain about the implications of this first plan.

    Google Scholar 

  86. Gopal, Nehru vol. 1, p. 349; Moore, Escape from empire, pp. 276–7.

    Google Scholar 

  87. A deliberate decision by the viceroy. See personal report 17, 16 Aug. 1947, CAB 127/111.

    Google Scholar 

  88. Gopal, Nehru vol. 1, pp. 342–3; Moore, Escape from empire, pp. 239–42.

    Google Scholar 

  89. Ibid. Congress leaders tended to think that ‘Pakistan’ would be so truncated and feeble that its reincorporation into an Indian union would follow sooner or later.

    Google Scholar 

  90. Reinforcing Britain’s military presence in India, the cabinet had concluded gloomily in June 1946 would put security at risk in Palestine and Greece. Cabinet 55 (46) 5 June 1946, Confidential annex, CAB 128/7.

    Google Scholar 

  91. See the account in M. Adas, The Burma delta (Madison, 1974).

    Google Scholar 

  92. See O. H. K. Spate, ‘The Burmese village’, Geographical Review XXXV, 4 (1945), pp. 523–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  93. N. Mansergh, Documents and speeches on British Commonwealth affairs 1931–52 II, (London, 1953) p. 762.

    Google Scholar 

  94. Ibid. II, pp. 762–5. These areas formed about 30 per cent of the whole area of Burma and had been excluded from the sphere of Burma’s ministerial government 1937–42.

    Google Scholar 

  95. See F. S. V. Donnison, British military administration in the Far East 1943–46 (London, 1956) pp. 332–4, 356, 365.

    Google Scholar 

  96. Governor of Burma (GoB) to Secretary of State for Burma (SSB), 17 Dec. 1946, CAB 27/128 (Sir Norman Brook papers).

    Google Scholar 

  97. I.B.C. 7 (46), 26 Nov. 1946, PREM 8/412.

    Google Scholar 

  98. GoB to SSB, 23 Jan. 1947; SSB to GoB, 25 Jan. 1947, PREM 8/412.

    Google Scholar 

  99. Cabinet 104 (46), 10 Dec. 1946, CAB 27/128.

    Google Scholar 

  100. GoB to SSB, 7 Dec. 1946; memo by SSB, 9 Dec. 1946; report by Chiefs of Staff, 18 Dec. 1946, all in PREM 8/412. GoB to SSB, 17 Dec. 1946, CAB 27/128.

    Google Scholar 

  101. Cabinet 9 (47) 17 Jan. 1947, PREM 8/412.

    Google Scholar 

  102. Conclusions of H.M.G. and delegation of Burma Executive Council, Cmd 7029 (1947), printed in Mansergh, Documents II, pp.766–70.

    Google Scholar 

  103. See GoB to SSB, 9 June 1947; Governor-General Malaya to Secretary of State for Colonies, 27 June 1947, PREM 8/412.

    Google Scholar 

  104. GoB to SSB, 29 May 1947, PREM 8/412.

    Google Scholar 

  105. Adas, Burma, p. 208; M. Collis, Trials in Burma (London, 1938). Between and cultivated land of Lower Burma was mortgaged to Indian bankers.

    Google Scholar 

  106. See W. G. East and O.H. K. Spate, The changing map of Asia (4th edn, London, 1961) p. 175.

    Google Scholar 

  107. Controversy over the default on debts continued to bedevil Burma’s relations with India long after independence. H. Tinker, Ballot box or bayonet? (London, 1964).

    Google Scholar 

  108. GoB to SSB, 8 June 1947, PREM 8/412.

    Google Scholar 

  109. Report of the Special Commission on the constitution of Ceylon (Donoughmore Commission) Cmd 3131 (1928) p. 31.

    Google Scholar 

  110. Ceylon: report of the commission on constitutional reform (Soulbury commission) Cmd 6677 (1945) pp. 20–3.

    Google Scholar 

  111. S. W. Kirby, The war against Japan II (London, 1958) pp. 107–8.

    Google Scholar 

  112. Ibid. II, p. 109.

    Google Scholar 

  113. Soulbury report, p. 27.

    Google Scholar 

  114. See the British government declaration, 26 May 1943, printed in Mansergh, Documents II, pp. 714–16.

    Google Scholar 

  115. See Soulbury report, 25, pp. 60–4.

    Google Scholar 

  116. Soulbury report, p. 110.

    Google Scholar 

  117. Ibid., p. 60.

    Google Scholar 

  118. Ibid., p. 64.

    Google Scholar 

  119. Ceylon: statement of policy on constitutional reform Cmd 6690 (1945) p. 7.

    Google Scholar 

  120. Round Table 149 (1947) p. 455.

    Google Scholar 

  121. Ibid., pp. 455–7.

    Google Scholar 

  122. Cabinet 44 (47), 6 May 1947, CAB 128/9.

    Google Scholar 

  123. Texts in Mansergh, Documents II, pp. 749–51.

    Google Scholar 

  124. Memo by P. C. Gordon-Walker, C.P. (48) 91, Mar. 1948, CAB 129/26.

    Google Scholar 

  125. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  126. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  127. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  128. Figures quoted in Donnison, British military administration, p. 375.

    Google Scholar 

  129. See T. E. Smith, ‘The immigration and permanent settlement of Chinese and Indians’ in C. D. Cowan (ed.) The economic development of South East Asia (London, 1964), p. 180.

    Google Scholar 

  130. A.J. Stockwell, ‘Colonial planning during World War II: the case of Malaya’, Jnl of Imperial and Commonwealth History 2, 3 (1974), 337.

    Google Scholar 

  131. See memo by Colonial Secretary, C.P. (45) 133, 20 Aug. 1945, CAB 129/1.

    Google Scholar 

  132. See Sir Frank Swettenham, British Malaya (revised edn, London, 1948) p. vi.

    Google Scholar 

  133. Donnison, British military administration, p. 140.

    Google Scholar 

  134. See B. Simandjuntak, Malayan federalism 1945–63 (London, 1969) pp. 39–41.

    Google Scholar 

  135. For the fear of communism, Donnison, British military administration, pp. 381–3.

    Google Scholar 

  136. Simandjuntak, Malayan federalism, pp. 45–9.

    Google Scholar 

  137. Cabinet 48 (47), 20 May 1947, CAB 128/9.

    Google Scholar 

  138. Memo by Chiefs of Staff, 7 Mar. 1947, D.O. (47) 23, CAB 131/4.

    Google Scholar 

  139. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  140. The British to show their good faith granted Trans-Jordan independence in 1946, but with a treaty of alliance. The Arab Legion retained its British officers.

    Google Scholar 

  141. In June 1946 there were some 38,000 British troops in the Cairo district alone. Cabinet 58 (46), 7 June 1946, CAB 128/5. This number alone represented a breach of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936.

    Google Scholar 

  142. Cabinet 7 (46), 22 Jan. 1946, CAB 128/5.

    Google Scholar 

  143. Cabinet 23 (46), 11 Mar. 1946; Cabinet 45 (46), 13 May 1946; both in CAB 128/5.

    Google Scholar 

  144. For the genesis of this offer see E. Lerman, ‘British diplomacy and the crisis of power in Egypt: the antecedents of the British offer to evacuate 7 May 1946’, in K. M. Wilson (ed.) Imperialism and nationalism in the Middle East: the Anglo-Egyptian experience 1882–1982 (London, 1983) pp. 96–122.

    Google Scholar 

  145. Cabinet 42 (46), 6 May 1946, CAB 128/5.

    Google Scholar 

  146. Cabinet 57 (46), 6 June 1946, CAB 128/5.

    Google Scholar 

  147. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  148. I.e. Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

    Google Scholar 

  149. Cabinet 58 (46), 7 June 1946, CAB 128/5.

    Google Scholar 

  150. Memoirs, pp. 386–7.

    Google Scholar 

  151. Defence Committee 1 Jan. 1947, CAB 131/4.

    Google Scholar 

  152. See the authoritative study M. J. Cohen, Palestine: retreat from the mandate 1936–1945 (London, 1978).

    Google Scholar 

  153. The best study of these efforts is now M. J. Cohen, Palestine and the great powers 1945–1948 (Princeton, 1982).

    Google Scholar 

  154. The Haganah, the official Jewish underground, opposed the terrorist tactics of the Irgun and the Stern Gang. But official Jewish organisations like the Jewish agency were implicated in a number of violent attacks.

    Google Scholar 

  155. See Cohen, Palestine 1945–48, pp. 126–34.

    Google Scholar 

  156. Cabinet 22 (47), 14 Feb. 1947, CAB 128/9.

    Google Scholar 

  157. See B. Rubin, The Arab states and the Palestine question (Syracuse, 1981) ch. 10 for a recent discussion.

    Google Scholar 

  158. Cabinet 72 (46), 23 July 1946; Cabinet 73 (46), 25 July 1946; CAB 128/6.

    Google Scholar 

  159. Cohen, Palestine 1945–48, pp. 77, 240, 241, 247–8.

    Google Scholar 

  160. Ibid., ch. 10; N. Bethell, The Palestine triangle (London, 1979).

    Google Scholar 

  161. Cohen, Palestine 1945–48, p. 247.

    Google Scholar 

  162. Bevin’s memo for Cabinet, C. P. (47) 259, 18 Sept. 1947, CAB 129/21.

    Google Scholar 

  163. See the gloomy forebodings of the chiefs of staff in the memo for Minister of Defence, C.P. (47) 262, 18 Sept. 1947, CAB 129/21.

    Google Scholar 

  164. Defence Committee 9 (48), 30 April 1948, CAB 131/5.

    Google Scholar 

  165. Memo by Foreign Secretary, D.O. (47) 65, 10 Sept. 1947, CAB 131/4.

    Google Scholar 

  166. See Cohen, Palestine 1945–48, p. 326 ff. But the British were anxious that Trans-Jordan should not affront the other Arab states. Rubin, Arab states, p. 181.

    Google Scholar 

  167. Cabinet 38 (47), 22 April 1947, CAB 128/9.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 1988 John Darwin

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Darwin, J. (1988). The Crisis of Empire, 1945–48. In: Britain and Decolonisation. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19547-3_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19547-3_3

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-29258-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-19547-3

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics