Justice as Dialogue: Ackerman and the Law of Contract

Abstract

No analysis of justice is sufficient by itself to enable us to make determinate judgements about the justice or injustice of particular states of affairs. This is not simply because of the independent requirement for accurate factual information relating to the actual situations under review. Actual justice assessments also require a specification of the normative criteria involved which is much more detailed than can be provided by any manageable explication of abstract concepts like merit, need or choice. Judgements on specific states of affairs presuppose specific norms which lay down not only what is to count, for instance, as merit, but also the weight to be given to such factors in the distribution of specific types and quantities of benefits and burdens. As far as these details are concerned philosophical presentations of conceptions of justice do little more than point us in a particular direction. Within the parameters of relevance established by any theory of justice much remains to be done before individual determinations of justice are possible.