Twin Challenges

Abstract

Whatever strategic concepts or conventional defence options they may choose to pursue through force improvement plans, NATO leaders will have to contend on the one hand with domestic demands for concomitant progress in arms control and, on the other, with increasingly sophisticated Soviet military and political counter-measures. The Warsaw Pact is acutely concerned with the implications of emerging developments in NATO doctrine and weaponry, and has already established the broad outlines of an integrated political and military response. Even before NATO’s renewed attention to its conventional defences, the Warsaw Pact was engaged in a series of initiatives designed to improve the capabilities of its forces to manoeuvre and strike deep into NATO’s rear areas. In addition, the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev has shown remarkable skill in its public diplomacy towards the West. In the wake of the INF treaty, Moscow seems sure to advance further dramatic proposals for sharply reducing battlefield nuclear weapons and conventional forces, such as those put forward in the June 1986 Warsaw Pact ‘Budapest Appeal’ and elaborated in the May 1987 Berlin Statement. The nature and credibility of the Alliance’s response to Moscow’s overtures will be critical. NATO governments cannot realistically expect to obtain domestic support for conventional force improvement plans without parallel efforts towards arms control. Thus, dealing with these Soviet military and political activities and shaping effective, broadly-supported military and arms control initiatives will be the twin challenges to NATO as it pursues its conventional defence options.