Abstract
The prospects for realizing dramatic improvements in NATO’s conventional capabilities do not appear auspicious from the perspective of enduring political and emerging economic and demographic trends. The main issues in the contempoary conventional defence debate echo concerns first heard 20 years ago. As in the past, there is little interest on either side of the Atlantic in expanding the size of conventional forces, and the dwindling manpower pool may preclude such a move, yet adding more brigades to Allied armies would be one of the best ways to improve conventional deterrence. Restraints on governmental spending throughout the Alliance will almost certainly limit the amount of resources available for military improvements, and will require difficult trade-offs to be made in formulating defence budgets. In developing its conventional defences, the Alliance will also have to confront new challenges from the Warsaw Pact on both the political and military fronts. While the East will also have to cope with resource constraints and demographic changes, Warsaw Pact military forces are likely at least to keep pace with NATO in their sophistication, effectiveness and size.
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Notes and References
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© 1988 International Institute for Strategic Studies
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Flanagan, S.J. (1988). The Elusive Consensus. In: NATO’s Conventional Defences. Studies in International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19484-1_2
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