Abstract
When sufficient and convincing data is available to indicate an international situation which is deemed ‘intolerable’ by the administration, the President or PM will call together a group of advisers, with whom discussions will take place throughout the period of the crisis. This group of people — the ‘crisis team’ — form the core from which the nation’s crisis behaviour is determined, for example, a progressive evolution of the core group has taken place in the US since the Second World War. Though there are basically two forms to this group — formal or informal (ad hoc) — several variations have been formulated for various crises since then, for example, the President of the USA has the right to mould it to his preferred style of decision-making. Formally, at a high level, the NSC may be used or, at a lower level, the WSAG may be allowed to conduct American crisis policy. The informal technique is the use of an ad hoc decision-making unit, such as that used during the missile crisis and Korea 1950, composed of advisers of the President’s choosing.
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Notes and References
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© 1988 Jonathan M. Roberts
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Roberts, J.M. (1988). The Individual and the Group. In: Decision-Making during International Crises. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19482-7_7
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