Ostpolitik: the Threat of ‘Differential Detente’

Abstract

In 1969, the Nixon Administration confronted what Kissinger considered one of the most important issues within the Alliance, the future of Germany.¹ This issue came to the fore as a result of two developments: (a) the reemergence of the Berlin problem; and (b) Chancellor Brandt’s commitment to pursue Ostpolitik. These developments presented the Administration with risks and opportunities. Chancellor Brandt’s offers to the USSR and the GDR to renounce the use of force and accept the status quo in Central Europe raised the threat of ‘differential detente’.² This endangered the cohesion of the Alliance and the implementation of the concept of linkage. The Berlin problem, however, could facilitate the implementation of linkage; only the US had the strength to counterbalance the isolation of Berlin. This permitted the Administration to control the process of European detente which ‘really’ began with Brandt’s initiatives.