Extended Deterrence, No First Use, and European Security

  • John Holdren

Abstract

The extension in extended deterrence occurs in two dimensions: the extension of nuclear deterrence to cover threats to one’s allies as well as to one’s own country; and its extension to cover non-nuclear as well as nuclear threats. This paper focuses mainly on the second of these dimensions — that is, on the idea that threatening to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack is a legitimate and effective means of deterring such attacks.

Keywords

Europe Expense Stein Arena Argentina 

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Copyright information

© Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 1988

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  • John Holdren

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