Connection between Horizontal and Vertical Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  • Vitaly Goldansky

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that the so-called vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, namely, the continuation of the nuclear arms race by the countries already possessing such arms, the expansion of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the improvement and development of new types of these weapons, their deployment in outer space, and so on, may well become the chief motive force of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons — its spread all over our planet — the chief cause of an increased number of nuclear-weapon states, and the main threat to the existing regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Keywords

Graphite Europe Uranium Explosive Argentina 

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Copyright information

© Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vitaly Goldansky

There are no affiliations available

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