The Colonial Question and the Reaction to Hitler 1933–35

Abstract

On Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor the major preoccupation of the British Cabinet in the field of foreign policy was the future of the disarmament conference, then at a critical stage. Indeed, the desire of the British government to bring the disarmament conference to a successful conclusion was the major element of its policy towards Germany. Hitler’s accession to power did not alter this strategy; it merely made it more difficult to pursue. There is, therefore, some substance in the argument that British policy in respect of the disarmament conference during 1933 was as much motivated by the desire that Britain should not be blamed for its breakdown, should that occur, as by the desire for its success per se.¹ But the wish that it should end positively was real enough as it was realised that failure ‘would have incalculable consequences for Europe and the League’.²