Abstract
On 3 March 1938 Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador at Berlin, presented Hitler a plan, which it was hoped by the British government would satisfy Germany’s colonial aspirations; the ambassador asked what in return Germany was prepared to contribute towards an atmosphere of détente in Europe. Hitler’s response was derisory. Nothing could be done to improve Anglo-German relations until the press campaign against him in Britain was brought to a halt; Germany would not permit the interference of third parties in her relations with central European states. As for colonies, they were not a pressing issue; Germany could wait as much as ten years for satisfaction in the colonial sphere.1
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Notes and References
The most extensive account contained in a non-official published work of the offer and of the interview between Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador at Berlin, and Hitler of 3 March 1938 is to be found in Sir Nevile Henderson’s Failure of a Mission, (London, 1940), pp. 114–8. The published diaries of the two Foreign Office officials, Sir Alexander Cadogan and Oliver Harvey, give some details, but provide very little of the background to the offer, see
D. Dilks (ed.), The Diary of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945, (London, 1971), pp. 40–58,
and J. Harvey (ed.), The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, (London, 1970), pp. 17–21, 61–2, and 78–109.
Some books summarily dismiss the colonial question, such as A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (London, 1964), pp. 139–40.
Others such as M. Gilbert and R. Gott, The Appeasers, (London, 1967), pp. 80–101, seize upon the issue as evidence of the cravenness of Chamberlain’s foreign policy. The colonial question is given some treatment in
I. Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet, (London, 1971), pp. 36–7, 39–40, 42–3, 53–4, 87–8, and 90;
K. Middlemas, The Diplomacy of Illusion, (London, 1972), pp. 110–4, 138–98, 141–3, and 148–56;
A. Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, (London, 1977), pp. 53–6, 67–8, 80 and 296–7;
R. Ovendale, ‘Appeasement’ and the English Speaking World, (Cardiff, 1975), pp. 34–5, 38, 47–8, 53, and 95–6;
G. L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–36, (Chicago and London, 1970), pp. 276–81, and The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II 1937–1939, Chicago and London, 1980), pp. 52–14.
D. J. Morgan, The Origins of British Aid Policy, (London, 1980), pp. 14–5.
Economic appeasement has in recent years been the subject of some penetrating researches, particularly by Germans. See B.-J. Wendt, Economic Appeasement: Handel und Finanz in der britischen Deutschland-Politik, 1933–1939, (Dusseldorf, 1971);
B.-J. Wendt, ‘Grossbritannien — Demokratie auf dem Prüfstand: Appeasement als Strategie des Status Quo,’ in E. Forndran, F. Golchewski and D. Riesenburger (eds), Innen-und Aussenpolitik unter nationalsozialistischer Bedrohung, (Opladen, 1977);
B.-J. Wendt, ‘“Economic Appeasement” — A Crisis Strategy’, in W. J. Mommsen and L. Kettenacker (eds), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London, 1983);
G. Schmidt, England in der Krise. Grundlagen und Grundzüge der britischen Appeasement-Politik, 1930–1937, (Wiesbaden, 1981);
G. Schmidt, ‘The Domestic Background to British Appeasement Policy’, in Mommsen and Kettenacker, op. cit.; P. Kennedy, ‘The Logic of Appeasement’, in The Times Literary Supplement, 28.5.1982;
C. A. MacDonald, ‘Economic Appeasement and the German “Moderates”, 1937–1939’, in Past and Present, 56 (1972); and Gilbert and Gott, op. cit., pp. 189–232.
It would be wrong to suggest that the colonial question in the post-war era has been totally neglected. The following works have examined it at considerable length, although the function of the colonial question in the formulation of British foreign policy has not yet been treated by any of them in the light of the currently available evidence: W. W. Schmokel, Dream of Empire, (New Haven, 1964);
K. Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich, Munich 1969; Gilbert and Gott, op. cit., pp. 80–101; Dez Anos de Política Externa, 1936–1947. A naçao portuguesa e a segunda auerra mundial, hereinafter cited as DAPE), (Lisbon 1961-), vols. I and II. O rearmamento do Exercito no quadro polítco da Aliança Luso-Britanica, 1936–1939: and
R. W. Logan, The African Mandates in World Politics, (Washington, 1948).
See P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (eds), Britain and Germany in Africa, (Yale, 1967);
R. Robinson, J. Gallagher and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians, (London, 1961);
W. O. Henderson, Studies in German Colonial History, (London, 1962);
A. J. P. Taylor, Germany’s First Bid for Colonies (London, 1938);
M. E. Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871–1885 (New York, 1920);
M. E. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire, 1884–1918 (New York, 1930);
and W. R. Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies (London, 1967).
Controversy still surrounds Bismarck’s motives. For example, the view has been advanced by H. A. Turner, jnr., in ‘Bismarck’s Imperialist Venture: Anti-British in Origin?’ in Gifford and Louis, op. cit., p. 50 that ‘Bismarck was not primarily motivated by any of the ulterior motives imputed to him … he simply changed his mind and decided that there must be overseas possessions … He acted, that is, only in order to avert what he feared might be the damaging effects of not doing so’. See also H.-U. Wehler, ‘Bismarck’s Imperialism 1862–1890’, in Past and Present, 48 (1970) and his Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Cologne/Berlin, 1969).
For P. Kennedy’s commentary on Wehler see ‘German Colonial Expansion. Has the “Manipulated Social Imperialism” been ante-dated?’ in Past and Present, 54 (1972).
For a discussion of these negotiations see P. H. S. Hatton, ‘Harcourt and Solf: the Search for an Anglo-German Understanding through Africa, 1912–1914’, European Studies Review, I (1971); R. Langhorne, ‘Anglo-German Negotiations Concerning the Future of the Portuguese Colonies, 1911–1914’, The Historical Review, XVI (1973); and J. O. Vincent-Smith, ‘The Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese Colonies in Africa, 1911–1914’, The Historical Review, XVII (1974).
Louis, Lost Colonies, pp. 31–32, and Woodruff D. Smith, The German Colonial Empire (Chapel Hill, 1978), pp. 183–220. Much has been done in recent years to rehabilitate the image of German colonial administration. A balanced view of its successes and failures can be found in
R. Oliver and G. Matthew (eds), History of East Africa, vol. I (London, 1963);
V. Harlow, E. M. Chilver and A. Smith (eds), History of East Africa, vol. II (London, 1965);
L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds), Colonialism in Africa, vol. I (London, 1969);
Gifford and Louis, op. cit.; I. Goldblatt, History of South-West Africa (Cape Town, 1971);
W. R. Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, 1884–1919 (London, 1963);
H. Bley South-West Africa under German Rule (London, 1971); Henderson, op. cit.; and Smith, op. cit.
F. Fischer Griff nach der Weltmacht, (Dusseldorf, 1961), pp. 90–95.
L. S. Amery, My Political Life, vol. II War and Peace (London, 1953), p. 161;
J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle-East, 1914–1920 (London, 1969), p. 17;
C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperialism (London, 1981), p. 70.
H. R. Winkler, The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain 1914–1918 (New Brunswick, 1952), p. 200.
Louis, Lost Colonies, p. 86. On Brailsford see the important new study, F. M. Leventhal, The Last Dissenter: H. N. Brailsford and his World (London, 1985). Norman Angell was fundamentally in favour of empire and preached the virtues of interdependence and federation over those of independence and nationalism.
See L. Bisceglia, Norman Angell and Liberal Internationalism in Britain, 1931–1935 (New York and London, 1982), pp. 64–5.
See also J. A. Hobson, Imperialism (London, 1901), pp. 101, 113–4 and 137;
H. N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold (London, 1915), pp. 326–8, and pp. 333–7;
L. W. Martin, Peace Without Victory (New Haven 1958), pp. 7 and 77;
and H. G. Wells, A Reasonable Man’s Peace (London, 1917). Wells thought an equitable colonial arrangement essential to a secure peace.
H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, (London, 1948), p. 112.
D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. II (London, 1938), p. 1515. See also PRO-CAB 23/5, Minutes of War Cabinet, 3.5.1918.
V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy (London, 1971), Appendix I.
PRO-CAB 29/1/3, Memorandum by J. C. Smuts, The German Colonies at the Peace Conference, 11.7.1918.
PRO — CAB23/42, Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, 20.12.1918, and S. Roskill, Hankey, vol. II (London, 1972), p. 37.
A. Bullock, Germany’s Colonial Demands (London, 1939), pp. 38–39.
Cf. the views of Colonel House in 1920 in N. G. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (New York, 1968), pp. 245–6. With hindsight it is, however, possible to see in the mandates system something more than hypocrisy and paternalism. In focusing attention on colonies and the issues of independence and self-determination it created the atmosphere in which decolonisation became possible.
See D. Armstrong, The Rise of the International Organisation (London, 1982), pp. 40–41.
V. R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (London, 1973), pp. 38–40.
R. Lansing, War Memoirs (Indianapolis, 1935), p. 197.
Ibid., Brockdorff-Rantzau to Clemenceau, Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, 29.5.1919, pp. 797–8 and 841–4. See also ibid., Brockdorff-Ranzau to Clemenceau, Statement of the Financial Commission of the German Delegation, 29.5.1919, p. 906.
Ibid., Clemenceau to Brockdorff-Rantzau, Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, 16.6.1919, pp. 932 and 951–4.
F. S. Joelson, Germany’s Claims to Colonies (London, 1939), p. 65.
M. Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1974), p. 72.
J. L. Garvin, The Economic Foundations of Peace (London, 1919), pp. 1, 260–1 and 266–7.
N. Angell, The Fruits of Victory (London, 1921) pp. 87–88, and W. H. Dawson Papers, (hereinafter cited as WHD), University of Birmingham Library, 1074, N. Angell to W. H. Dawson, 9.12.1929.
The Germans feared that the realisation of ‘closer union’ in east Africa would destroy the distinctive status of Tanganyika and end in its annexation. This would effectively preclude its reacquisition by Germany. ‘Closer union’ was, in fact, shelved by the British government in 1932 following a report by a joint select committee of both houses of parliament, but the permanent mandates commission which had followed these developments attentively was on the whole inclined to take a doubtful view of the British proposals. At its twenty-third session in 1933 it passed a resolution which took note of Britain’s decision not to effect in east Africa a political or constitutional union which would endanger the existence of Tanganyika ‘as a distinct entity in international law’ and stated that any such political union could not be carried out while the mandate was in force. On the German objections, see WHD, 1022, Heinrich Schnee to W. H. Dawson, 15.2.1929; and PRO — FO 371.13615/C290/43/18, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir A. Chamberlain, 1.2.1929, ibid., 14948/W91266/10/98, German aide memoire, 4.9.1930 and ibid., 15225/C2093/929/18, W. H. Dawson to R. G. Leigh, 25.3.1931. See also B. T. G. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (London, 1961), p. 61ff.
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© 1988 Andrew J. Crozier
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Crozier, A.J. (1988). Introduction. In: Appeasement and Germany’s Last Bid for Colonies. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19255-7_1
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