Abstract
In Chapter 8 I introduced a ‘theorem’ that postulated the uncomfortable necessity of either decoupling or ‘uncoupling’ the central and extended theatres. That is, the current strategic context required the President either to refuse to use nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe (or other non-US states) or confine their use to European (or other non-Soviet) theatres. Chapters 9, 10, and 11 explored various compensations for the undesirable politico-strategic consequences of this theorem: perhaps the resulting public alienation from deterrence could be cured by shrewdly packaged arms control proposals; perhaps as before, doctrinal innovations might be introduced to resolve the crisis; finally, perhaps a new generation of strategic weapons might be deployed that could evade the theorem. In this and the next chapter, I will discuss some consequences of simply abandoning extended deterrence in those theatres where the political culture makes the operation of the theorem strategically significant, since it is the effort to maintain extended deterrence that engages the theorem in the first place.
Chi poria mai pur con parole sciolte dicer del sangue e delle piaghe a pieno ch’ i’ ora vidi, per narrar più volte?
(Who could ever tell, even with words untrammelled and the tale often repeated, of all the blood and the wounds I saw now?)
Canto XXVIII, Inferno
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Notes and References
Reported in Le Monde, 16 January 1963, quoted in C. H. Amme, Jr. (ed.), Problems Posed by Conflicting Views Concerning Nuclear Weapons: Conflicting Views of Major NATO Nations on the Control and Use of Nuclear Weapons TR-5104–2 (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1965), p. 14.
P. Hassner, Change and Security in Europe, Part 2: In Search of a System, Adelphi Paper no. 49 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968), P. 7.
See, e.g., Richard Rosencrance, ‘Deterrence in Dyadic and Multipolar Environments’, in R. Rosencrance (ed.), The Future of the International Strategic System (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972)
Ciro Elliott Zoppo, ‘Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity and International Stability’, World Politics, vol. 18, no. 4, 1966
John J. Weltman, ‘Managing Nuclear Multipolarity’, International Security 6 (Winter 1981–2), pp. 182–194.
See, e.g., J. Gruca, French Contributions to Strategic Theory in the Nuclear Age: Strategic Theories of Beanfre, Gallois, Aron, and Ailleret Memorandum no. DRAE M44 (Ottowa: Defence Research Analysis Establishment, 1973). We have had considerable experience, after all, with a multipolar international environment. This was the configuration from the Treaty of Utrecht, with brief exception, until World War I.
K. N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
Chief of Staff General Ailleret stated this policy, “’Directed” Defense or “Defense in All Directions”’, The Review of National Defense (December 1967), subsequently confirmed by President de Gaulle, New York Times, 30 January 1968
quoted in M. W. Hoag, Superpower Strategic Postures for a Multilateral World, P-4201 (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation 1969), p. 4.
Quoted in Pierre Gallois, ‘US Strategy and the Defense of Europe,’ Orbis 8 (Summer 1963), pp. 248–9.
See Andrew Pierre, ‘Can Europe’s Security Be ‘Decoupled from America’, in C. Kemp, R. L. Pfaltzgraff and U. Ra’anan (eds), The Superpowers in a Multinuclear World (Lexington: D. C. Heath & Co., 1974), pp. 45–62: See also The Changing US—Soviet Strategic Balance: Implications for Nuclear Multipolarity which concludes that a European deterrent force would have to approximate the American strategic forces. Moreover, the deployment of defensive systems by the US and the USSR would ensure such a requirement.
Japan’s actual defence outlays in fiscal year 1981 already ranked eighth in the world, although her GNP ratio of.9 per cent devoted to defense expenditure is one of the lowest. Yukio Satoh, The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy, Adelphi Paper no. 178 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 24.
Richard K. Betts, ‘Conventional Forces: What Price Readiness?’ Survival 25 (January/February 1983), pp. 25–34
see also William Kaufmann, ‘The Defense Budget’ in J. A. Pechman (ed.), Setting National Priorities: The 1983 Budget (Washington: Brookings, 1982).
Although it should be noted that Japanese ratification of the Treaty did not come quickly and finally occurred only after the Japanese foreign minister obtained reaffirmation of the US security guarantee. J. Yaeger, (ed.), Nonproliferation and US Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings, 1980) p. 26.
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution provides: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. It should be noted, however, that the argument has been made in the Japanese Diet that nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature and therefore does not violate this provision. No less a jurist than the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan has in fact argued that Japan should develop a nuclear weapons capability. T. Tsurutani, Japanese Policy and East Asian Security (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 95.
R. Jervis, Deterrence Theory Revisited, ACIS Working Paper no. 14 (Los Angeles: Center for Arms Control and National Security, 1978), p. 45.
Your action desperate Threat to human survival. No conceivable justification. Civilized man condemns it. We will not have mass murder. Ultimatum means war. I do not speak for power but plead for civilized man. End this madness.’ quoted in A. E. Wessel, Some Implications of Strategic Concepts for Western European Nuclear Weapons, P-2904 (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1964), p. 11.
R. K. Betts, Surprise Attack (Washington: Brookings, 1982), Chapter 2.
See G. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-five Years (New York: Dunellen, 1970) for numerous examples, such as President Kennedy’s siting of B-47s on civilian airfields during the Cuban missile crisis, also noted by Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy p. 244.
A. Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (London: Faber, 1965), p. 100.
See U. Nerlich, The Alliance and Europe: Part V Nuclear Weapons and East-West Negotiation, Adelphi Paper no.120 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975–6), pp. 1–11.
The cost of developing a capability which would seriously disturb the superpowers (as opposed to one’s unarmed neighbor) is staggering.’ J. R. Schlesinger, The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, P-3393 (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1966), p. 9.
‘West Germany is the premier example of a nation where the dominant disincentive to go nuclear has been security guarantees.’ T. A. Halsted, Nuclear Proliferation: How to Retard It, Manage It, Live With It (Princeton: Aspen Institute Program in International Affairs, 1977), p. 7. ‘According to Dr Kosaka [a Japanese specialist in strategic affairs] a principal factor militating against the development of nuclear weapons is the US [nuclear] guarantee.’ R. L. Pfaltzgraff, The Changing US—Soviet Strategies Balance: Implications for Nuclear Multipolarity p. 172.
Bull, ‘European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO’, Foreign Affairs 61 (Spring 1983), p. 874.
Bull, ‘A New Course for Britain and Western Europe’, SAIS Review 41 (Summer 1983), p. 47
see also B. Burrows and G. Edwards, The Defence of Western Europe (Guildford: Butterworth Scientific, 1982).
R. M. Lawrence, W. R. Van Cleave, and S. E. Young, Summary Report: Implications of Indian and/or Japanese Nuclear Proliferation for US Defense Policy Planning, SSC-TN-1933–1 (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1973), p. 31.
On the issue of public opinion regarding Japanese acquisition, see Robinson, ‘Japan’s Growing Strategic Role: Public Attitude Shift Spurs Major Military Improvement’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 14 January 1980, pp., 46–7. A 1980 survey of Japanese Chamber of Commerce members showed a majority thought Japan ought to possess nuclear weapons.
Taketsugu Tsurutani, ‘Old Habits, New Times: Challenges to Japanese-American Security Relations’, International Security 7 (1982), pp. 175, 183–4. Shapiro reports that from 1976 to 1979 poll figures measuring the number of Japanese who believed Japan would acquire nuclear weapons within ten years went from 28 per cent to 40 per cent.
Isaac Shapiro, ‘The Risen Sun’, Foreign Policy 41 (1980–1), p. 31.
Regarding the FRG, see P. Windsor, Germany and the Western Alliance: Lessons from the 1980 Crises, Adelphi Paper no. 170 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
Robinson, ‘Japan’s Growing Strategic Role: Japan Pushes Toward Space Launcher Development’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 January 1980, p. 51.
Unpublished remarks of Prof. Steven Weinberg, at the Conference on Reducing the Risks of Accidental Nuclear War, University of Texas, 1983, transcript, pp. 79–80; see also R. Rosencrance, Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered, Adelphi Paper no.116 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 27–33.
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© 1988 Philip Bobbitt
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Bobbitt, P. (1988). Multipolarity. In: Democracy and Deterrence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18991-5_12
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