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Conclusion: Action, Structure and Realist Philosophy

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Part of the book series: Contemporary Social Theory

Abstract

The crucial issue for realist naturalism is the sense to be given to structural concepts in the social sciences. Unlike reductionist forms of positivist naturalism, which tend to be attracted by behaviourism, a realist naturalism emphasises the stratification of reality as a general metaphysical principle. In the form defended here, it also accepts the ‘hermeneutic’ principle that the concepts and theories of the social sciences must make substantial reference to those of actors in the life-world. At the centre of our social ontology there must be, then, the commonsense picture of physically distinct persons capable of independent action: what Harré and Secord ironically called ‘the anthropomorphic model of man’.1

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References

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  6. Cf. Scott Lash and John Urry, ‘The New Marxism of Collective Action: A Critical Analysis’, Sociology, vol. 18, no. 1, 1984, pp. 33–50.

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  10. One should note however that, like most social theory, it skates around issues to do with the intrinsic or pre-social powers of human beings — issues which are crucial to psychology and linguistics. See Trevor Pateman, Language in Mind and Language in Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

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  25. Cf. ibid., p. 117.

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  27. See, for example, T. M. Bloomfield, ‘Psychoanalysis: a Human Science?’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 9, no. 3, 1979, pp. 271–87; David Will, ‘Psychoanalysis as a Human Science’, British Journal of Medical Psychology, vol. 53, no. 3, 1980, pp. 201–11.

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  28. For an overview, see Trevor Pateman, ‘Philosophy of Linguistics’, in Richard Coates et al. (eds), New Horizons in Linguistics 2 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, forthcoming).

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  29. Social scientists, for example, now have an excellent and very accessible methodological text written from a realist standpoint: Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science (London: Hutchinson, 1984).

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  30. Cf. Norman Stockman, Anti-Positivist Theories of the Sciences.

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© 1987 William Outhwaite

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Outhwaite, W. (1987). Conclusion: Action, Structure and Realist Philosophy. In: New Philosophies of Social Science. Contemporary Social Theory. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18946-5_8

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