Conclusions

Abstract

The object of this short study has been to obtain an insight into the Soviet political, economic and military view of CBW, in order to make a judgement on the likelihood and intent on the part of the USSR and Warsaw Pact to conduct offensive CB operations. This monograph is, of necessity, a somewhat superficial discussion of a complex and multi-level subject. There has been no attempt to link or fit any of the deductions into scenarios, since these would be entirely dependent upon a wide range of assumptions, most of which would be open to question or variation. In particular, it must be said that the Soviet Union does not hold the same moral perceptions regarding CBW as the West. As a result of over sixty years of indoctrination, preparation and training, both the civilian and military sectors of the population of the USSR are conditioned to accepting the possibility and prospect of CBW. The Soviet ‘scientific’ view of war makes it unlikely that they would feel bound by the same constraints as the West in the matter of CBW. It would appear that the Soviet High Command considers that current developments in novel CB agents have revolutionised the style and character of modern warfare, leading to a quantum, rather than an incremental, change in the nature and practice of war. Certainly, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces have an impressive capability to conduct offensive and defensive CBW. This is backed by considerable Soviet investment in research, development, production and stockpiling.