Russia’s Defection and the Western Front

Abstract

In their treatment of the matter of the transfer of German troops from East to West at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, Soviet writers follow two not entirely compatible lines: on the one hand, the Bolsheviks, they say, hindered this transfer, while, on the other, in so far as it occurred, it was a Good Thing. What were the circumstances? The German High Command had at that time grave need of extra troops on the Western Front. After their losses in the Somme battle in 1916 they had been unable to launch any large-scale offensive in France, that is, on the front they knew to be the decisive one, and concentrated their efforts instead against Russia, Romania and Italy, while hoping (vainly) for big results from the U-boat campaign.¹ America’s entry into the war then brought the threat that large fresh armies from across the Atlantic would soon join the tired French and British. The Bolshevik revolution and its peace initiative came at the right moment for Germany. When General Hoffmann, chief of staff of the Germans’ northern army group on the Russian front, learnt of the Bolsheviks’ request for an armistice, he telephoned the news to Ludendorff, who asked: ‘Is it possible to negotiate with these people?’ Hoffmann replied: ‘Yes, it is possible to negotiate with them. Your Excellency needs troops, and this is the quickest way to get them.’²