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Spurious Explanations

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Inquiry and Understanding

Abstract

Spurious explanations are those that appear to give greater understanding by suggesting causes (and apparently supplying bases for predictions), and/or by suggesting theories that seem to set the explicandum in a larger conceptual frame. In Chapter 5 (p. 46) it was noted that concepts that are vague may make explanations so loose that they can be regarded as compatible and as incompatible with the same situation. ‘Vandalism is caused by unemployment’ can be interpreted in such a way that advocates of the explanation can always find evidence to support it and objectors may use the same evidence to refute it. These explanations are not being criticised because they are thought to be wrong but because they are thought to be spurious. Critics say that, for example, the Freudian theory that neuroses are caused by an inferiority complex is spurious since it turns out that any observed behaviour, submissive or aggressive, can be ‘explained’ by appeal to this complex. Since the theory can ‘explain’ any behaviour that is observed it cannot be used to predict what will be observed; the ‘explanation’ is always post hoc. An essential feature of a genuine empirical explanation is that it arises from theories (and laws) that exclude certain outcomes1 and so allow us to predict (within prescribed limits) what will happen.

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Notes

  1. See Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 33–7.

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  2. The current revival of interest in astrology supports Thagard’s view of pseudo-science. He argues that it is up to individuals and to scientific communities to investigate alternatives and consider new interpretations of observations; he is not advocating a cultural relativism. His concluding paragraph is: In conclusion, I would like to say I think the question of what constitutes a pseudo-science is important. Unlike the logical positivists, I am not grinding an anti-metaphysical axe, and unlike Popper, I am not grinding an anti-Freudian or anti-Marxian one. My concern is social: society faces the twin problems of lack of public concern with the advancement of science, and lack of public concern with the important ethical issues now arising in science and technology, for example around the topic of genetic engineering. One reason for this dual lack of concern is the wide popularity of pseudo-science and the occult among the general public. Elucidation of how science differs from pseudo-science is the philosophical side of an attempt to overcome public neglect of genuine science. (Ibid., p. 230) the bundle together. See D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 252.

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© 1987 Jennifer Trusted

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Trusted, J. (1987). Spurious Explanations. In: Inquiry and Understanding. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18823-9_9

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