Abstract
In Chapter 1 it was stated that an important aspect of explanation consisted in relating the phenomenon to be explained (the explicandum) to some accepted regularity, that is to an empirical law. If this can be done we are on the way to producing a causal explanation as to why the phenomenon occurred and/or why it was as it was.
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Notes
C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientiftc Explanation (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1965), ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, pp. 245 et seq.
A. Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 52–3.
For an elementary discussion of this point see Trusted, Logic of Scientific Inference, Chapter 4, and Trusted, Introduction to the Philosophy of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1981), Chapter 7.
J. Kempthorn (1775–1838), Hymns of Praise (1796).
A. J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 220.
C. G. Hempel, ‘The Logic of Scientific Explanation’ in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Feigl and Brodbeck (eds) (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1953), p. 323.
N. Rescher, Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1970), p. 145.
I. Scheffler, The Anatomy of Inquiry (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 41–2.
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© 1987 Jennifer Trusted
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Trusted, J. (1987). The D-N Model and the Concept of Law. In: Inquiry and Understanding. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18823-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18823-9_6
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