Facts and Theories

Abstract

In the previous chapter it was stated that all empirical facts, even the most simple, those seemingly directly ‘given’, depend on the interpretation of sensation by means of concepts and that concepts are the basis of knowledge. Our concepts of familiar objects and materials and our concepts of people and social customs depend on our early experiences and develop from what were called ‘instinctive beliefs’, based on a fundamental human (probably animal) tendency to trust in and to expect a regular association of properties and qualities. Therefore, on seeing a familiar object, such as a glass of water, we all assume that it has properties that are not currently perceived. Now instead of relating our instinctive beliefs to concepts, we could say that they emerge as a result of spontaneous theories as to the nature of what we perceive. Such theories support our concepts and give rise to our expectations (predictions) about the world. It may seem downright misleading to assert that such expectations involve the acceptance of theories, for we take the properties of well-known and familiar objects and materials to be matters of fact and we contrast fact with theory. This is because we do not generally reflect on the basis of our knowledge of familiar facts and certainly do not formulate explicitly either our expectations or the theories that support them.