Africa’s Continuing Crises: The Elusiveness of Development

  • John Ravenhill
Part of the Macmillan International Political Economy Series book series


Sub-Saharan Africa is currently suffering an economic crisis of a magnitude unprecedented in its recent history. According to the World Bank, ‘a real possibility’ exists that per capita incomes will fall below those levels which prevailed when most countries gained their independence, 25 years ago. Although impressive welfare gains have been made in the interim in areas such as health care, education, and housing, these are threatened by the continuing and deepening economic crisis. Already, as Green and Singer note, the welfare gap between Africa and other least developed countries has widened.3 SubSaharan Africa is the only region in which per capita food production has declined over the last two decades. Not coincidentally, it is the region with the fastest growth of population and the only one in which rates of population growth are projected to increase during the 1980s.


International Monetary Fund Ivory Coast Accelerate Development African Government Export Earning 
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© John Ravenhill 1986

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