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Abstract

The problems of examining the patterns of business group activity in the political processes of modern political systems are formidable. Firstly, there is the difficulty of identifying the groups themselves. In the capitalist countries there is a large, highly visible private sector of the economy where decisions on production, investment, employment and the like are taken by individual firms. There are different patterns of ownership, varying from small family businesses to large domestically based corporations; there are multi-national companies and industries owned or partly owned by the state itself. There is a variety of organisations seeking to unite these disparate elements of what is nonetheless widely regarded as the ‘business community’.

‘Great trade will always be attended with considerable abuses.’ (Edmund Burke)

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Notes to Chapter 3

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© 1986 Alan R. Ball and Frances Millard

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Ball, A.R., Millard, F. (1986). Businessmen and Bureaucrats. In: Pressure Politics in Industrial Societies. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18257-2_3

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