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Abstract

Churchill’s view that Germany could be defeated in the end turned on the premise that the United States and the Soviet Union would both be brought into the war on Britain’s side. Although there were faint Russo-German rumblings over Romania in the summer of 1940, and rather more serious contentions over Bulgaria during the ensuing winter, it was still very far from certain that either party would regard such disputes as of vital importance, or as incapable of resolution. In January 1941 a Russo-German Trade Agreement was concluded, which suggests that in economic fields at any rate co-operaton between the two countries was still close. In the spring of that year, however, points of difference became increasingly noticeable.

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© 1986 Roy Douglas

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Douglas, R. (1986). Grand Alliance. In: World Crisis and British Decline, 1929–56. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18194-0_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18194-0_9

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-40579-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-18194-0

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

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