Abstract
When classifying industrial relations systems in terms of corporatist theory, it is useful to think of a continuum, starting at one extreme with contestative relations, moving through pluralist bargaining and bargained corporatism, and ending at authoritarian corporatism. Elsewhere (Crouch, 1983b) I have defined the poles of this continuum in terms of the role of representatives being, respectively, purely representative and purely disciplinary. But this tells us very little of the inner dynamics of different ideal typical systems. How do these different kinds ofindustrial relations ‘work’? In particular, how, in detail, do pluralist and corporatist forms of bargaining differ? This can be done most clearly if the argument is set out formally. There is nothing that can be called mathematics in this, but readers who have a horror of formal analysis can skip the symbols, as everything is contained within the verbal account.
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© 1985 Roger King
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Crouch, C. (1985). Corporatism in Industrial Relations: a Formal Model. In: Grant, W. (eds) The Political Economy of Corporatism. Sociology, Politics and Cities. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18041-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18041-7_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-36899-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-18041-7
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