Abstract
The armed forces have played a central role in maintaining the political order in the past six decades in Iran. A key element in the emergence of Reza Shah as king in 1921, the army remained the basis of support for the subsequent Pahlavi regime. Since the 1979 revolution, the clergy have also used armed men in both regular and irregular forces, to secure their hold over the country. The policy of using armed government forces primarily against internal opponents has continued despite the revolution. Although the current war against Iraq has added a new dimension to the operation of Iranian armed forces, it is the contention of this paper that the primary role of the government’s militia is to act as repressive agents of the regime and to eliminate internal, rather than external opposition.
I am very grateful to General Fereydoun Djam for his considerable help and for providing much of the information contained in this article.
Thanks are similarly due to Mr Medhi Samyi and Mr Eprim Eshaq. As well, I should like to thank Fred Halliday for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and for lending me his copy of Dr Salamtian’s thesis and the Staff Report on Military Sales to Iran.
However, the responsibility for any misunderstanding or controversial opinion is entirely mine.
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Notes
A. Salamatian, ‘Historique du Rôle Politique de I’Armée en Iran’, thesis for the Faculty of Law & Economics at Paris University, February 1970, p. 106.
Ibid, p. 115.
Ibid, p. 109.
Ibid, p. 111.
General H. Arfa Under Five Shahs (London: John Murray, 1964) p. 283.
Ibid, p. 342.
S. Zabih The Communist Movement in Iran (University of California Press, 1966) p. 178.
M. R. Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980) p. 157.
Draft report to the National Security Council by NSC Board 21 December 1953. Quoted by Y. Alexander and A. Nanes (eds) The US and Iran: A Documentary History (University Publication of America, 1980) p. 268.
Ibid, p. vii. William H. Sullivan, US Ambassador, notes that many of the American instructors ‘proved to be a partially disruptive element in US-Iranian relations’, W. H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (W. W. Norton & Co, New York and London 1981) p. 80.
Ibid, p. ix.
Ibid, p. 49.
Ibid, p. 36.
B. Rubin Paved with Good Intentions (Oxford University Press, 1980) pp. 164–5.
Anthony Parsons British Ambassador notes that the Iranian army were quite unable to disperse even small crowds by baton charges and anti-riot techniques; ‘the Iranian army was behaving as though it was fighting a war against a national enemy’. Anthony Parson The Pride and the Fall, Jonathan Cape, London 1984, p. 104.
Ayatollah Montazeri’s address to the Clergy, Kayhan, 2 February 1984.
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© 1985 Haleh Afshar
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Afshar, H. (1985). The Army. In: Afshar, H. (eds) Iran. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17966-4_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17966-4_9
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