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Hitler’s Ultimate Aims — A Programme of World Dominion?

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Aspects of the Third Reich

Abstract

Any discussion of Hitler’s alleged ‘programme’for achieving world dominion should be preceded by an attempt at terminological clarification. ‘World Dominion’ or ‘World Domination’ obviously convey something different from ‘World Power’; all the same and all grammatical incongruities notwithstanding, both terms are often used as synonyms.1 To illustrate the point: there is no need to elaborate further on the statement that Hitler wanted the Third Reich to achieve or regain world power status. This has never been in controversy, but in the early and mid-1980s Hitler’s foreign policy already gave rise to a widespread tendency abroad to interpret his ‘real’ aims as the ‘achievement of world domination’. Hitler’s often quoted dictum ‘Deutschland wird entweder Weltmacht oder überhaupt nicht sein’ should — so it was conjectured — be plainly read to mean: Germany must achieve world domination or it will perish.2

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Notes and References

  1. One glaring example of terminological juggling is the German title of Fritz Fischer’s spectacular book Griff nach der Weltmacht. Weltmacht (World Power) signifying the status of a ‘nation having influence in world politics’, ‘reaching for it’ is a malapropism; what the author obviously wished to convey was Weltherrschaft (World Dominion). For reasons of space it was necessary to restrict references in this paper to the barest essentials.

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  2. A. Hitler. Mein Kampf (Munich, 1941), pp. 741–2. Cf. D. Aigner, Das Ringen um England (Munich, 1969), pp. 84, 244, ibid., Anmerkungsband, pp. 68, 139; see also n. 34 below. One of the chief champions of this controversy, H. W. Steed, former editor of The Times, had already written in 1924, when referring to Wilhelminian Germany: ‘The German watchword ”World Mastery [sic!] or Downfall” [“Weltmacht oder Untergang”, D.A.] tersely stated the alternatives.... The rest of the world had to choose between submission and resistance to it.’ (H. W. Steed; Through 30 Years, vol. 2 (London, 1924), p. 389.

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  3. Norman Cohn, Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion. Der Mythos von der ‘judischen Weltverschwörung’ (Cologne, 1969) (English version, Warrant for Genocide) (‘One of the most fervent and trusting readers of [the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”] was Adolf Hitler’); cf. also Albert Speer, Spandauer Tagebücher (Berlin, 1975), p. 45. Jochen Thies, Architekt der Weltherrschaft (Düsseldorf, 1976), p. 188 is of the opinion that it is this belief which inspired Hitler with ideas of world dominion of his own.

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  4. Annual Register 1939 (London, 1940), pp. 27–8. Chamberlain used the same language when addressing the Foreign Policy Committee of the British Cabinet; see S. Newman, March 1939 — The British Guarantee to Poland (Oxford, 1976), p. 152.

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  5. A vivid and thoroughly representative cross-section of ‘world opinion’ regarding Hitler’s Germany is provided by a two-volume NS documentation called Hitler in der Karikatur der Welt, ed. by Ernst Hanfstaengl (Berlin, 1933/1934).

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  6. See, among others, S. Erckner, Hitler’s Conspiracy Against Peace (London, 1937), pp. 149–94 (chapters ‘Germany — lord of the Earth’ and ‘A Deal with England’) where the term ‘conquest by stages’ (p. 184) is used for the first time, and James Turner’ [i.e. the Communist scholar Jürgen Kuczynski], Hitler and the Empire (London, 1936), pp. 14, 39.

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  7. Erckner, Hitler’s Conspiracy, p. 152 and passim (Delbrück, Max Weber and Johannes Haller as chief witnesses for Pangermanism with a direct reference to the London Morning Post).

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  8. See, among others, H. Wanderscheck, Weltkrieg und Propaganda (Berlin, 1936), pp. 100–13. ‘Deutschland über alles’ was superseded during the 1930s and 1940s by what seemed to some authors another call for world domination: ‘Today Germany is ours, tomorrow the whole world’. The author of these lines, Hans Baumann, wrote them in 1932 for a Catholic youth group, of which he was a member. The song was later adopted — with some variations — by the Hitler Youth. However, the words have been falsified. The original, as sung by the Hitler Youth, runs as follows: ‘Today Germany listens to us — tomorrow the whole world’.

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  9. See, among others, The British Way and Purpose, published by the Directorate of Army Education, B.W.P. 1 (November 1942) pp. 13–14. (The fighting spirit of the German soldier is seen to derive from his ‘unshakable faith’ in Hitler’s power ‘to lead the German people to victory and the world dominion by the “master race”.... To take part in the conquest of the world may be a villainous thing, but it can stir the blood and inspire self-sacrifice’.)

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  10. Stephen L. Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines — Democracy, Nationalism and the Committee of Public Information (Chapel Hill, 1980), pp. 83–97.

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  11. See, among others, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938 volume, pp. 491–3; also the 1941 volume, pp. 387–9, 529–30, 532 (‘the Government of Germany, pursuing its course of world conquest...’). For the role of NS activists in the United States see G. H. W. Grässner, Deutschland und die Nationalsozialisten in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 1933–1939 (PhD thesis, Bonn, 1973) and S. A. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States 1924–1941 (Ithaca, 1974).

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  12. PRO 1939 C18260/1645/18, C1323/53/18, W9815/72/49, C620/620/18, L1649/1649/407; Beatrix Bouvier, Die Deutsche Freiheitspartei (PhD thesis, Frankfurt, 1972) pp. 87–91, 95, 99–100. In the US Rauschning was the author of a number of purely propagandist publications, including ‘Hitler Told Me This’, in The American Mercury, December 1939, pp. 385–93; ‘Hitler Could Not Stop’, in Foreign Affairs, October 1939, pp. 1–12; Hitler Wants the World (London, 1941), also in Spanish under the title Hitler codicia el mundo. Rauschning’s ‘revelations’ of Hitler’s alleged intentions in Latin America have been unanimously discounted by specialists working in this field: Arnold Ebel (1971), Klaus Volland (1976), and Reiner Pommerin (1977). Recent American research dispenses with Rauschning altogether.

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  13. Even during the course of the Second World War the US State Department was forced to concede that it did not possess any hard evidence: ‘It is impossible to adduce from the writings of Hitler or other Nazi leaders direct statements indicating that they aspire to the domination of the entire world’. See National Socialism. Prepared by the Special Unit of the Division of European Affairs, Dept. of State, by Raymond E. Murphy (Washington, DC, 1943), p. 56. See also G. Moltmann, ‘Weltherrschaftsideen Hitlers’, in Europa und Übersee: Festschrift für Egmont Zechlin (Hamburg, 1961), p. 221; B. M. Russett, No Clear and Present Danger — A skeptical view of the U.S. entry into World War II (New York, 1972).

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  14. The Nuremberg Verdict. German edition, Das Urteil von Nürnberg, 1946 (Munich, 1961), pp. 42–6.

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  15. See, for example, M. Michael’s review of Klaus Hildebrand’s ‘Vom Reich zum Weltreich’, International Affairs, 64 (1970), 749, and Newman, March 1939, p. 222.

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  16. See, for example, ‘Erklärung der Kommission der Historiker der DDR und der UdSSR’ of 1 September 1969, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 17, (1969), 1448.

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  17. See the relevant publications by Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat, notably also T. W. Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft (Opladen, 1975). For the controversy between ‘functionalists’ and ‘intentionalists’ among German historians see, among others, Der ‘Führerstaat’ — Mythos und Realität (Stuttgart, 1981) (publications of the German Historical Institute, London, Vol. 8).

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  18. This stance was first taken by A. J. P. Taylor and has been adopted by a number of younger British historians such as R. Skidelsky, E. M. Robertson, M. Cowling, S. Newman, and N. Stone; in Germany notably by Oswald Häuser, Josef Henke, and the author of this paper.

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  19. Mein Kampf pp. 728–43; see also A. V. N. van Woerden, ‘Hitler Faces England’, Acta Nederlandica, 3 (1968), 150–1, note.

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  20. See in particular Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Stragie (Frankfurt/Main, 1965); also his ‘Der Faktor Amerika in Hitlers Strategie 1938–1941’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 19 (1966), 3–21; his ‘England’s Place in Hitler’s Plan for World Dominion’, Journal of Contemporary History, 9 (1974), 5–21. Klaus Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich (Munich, 1969); also his Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933–1945, 4th edn (Stuttgart, 1980). Milan Hauner, ‘Did Hitler Want a [sic] World Dominion?’, Journal of Contemporary History, 13 (1978), 15–32. Hauner’s Cambridge doctoral dissertation India in Axis Strategy (Stuttgart, 1981), fails to substantiate his contention that Hitler followed ‘a preconceived plan of world conquest’.

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  21. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, passim, notably p. 592.

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  22. Bernd Martin, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1942 (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 300–1, assumes from Hitler’s peace initiative in July 1940 that Britain was not to be accepted as a partner on equal footing. This may be true for 1940, but would this also apply for the years before the war had started?

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  23. See ibid., especially pp. 132–53 and 207–33. Hitler’s attitude towards the US is made plain in his speeches of 28 April 1939 and 11 December 1941. The 1938/39 Washington reports of Polish ambassador Count Potocki, published by the German Foreign Office in March 1940, have now generally been accepted as authentic: Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg. Geheimdokumente zur Kriegspolitik des Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, herausgegeben von der Archivkommission des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin, 1943). There is little doubt that they largely contributed to Hitler’s view of the US as a potential enemy.

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  24. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, pp. 90–102, 310–34; also his ‘Der Faktor Amerika’, pp. 9–15; and in Weltpolitik II (Göttingen, 1975), p. 270.

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  25. For the basic world-wide antagonism towards NS Germany see, among others, Erhard Forndran et al. (eds), Innen-und Aussenpolitik unter nationalsozialistischer Bedrohung (Opladen, 1977); G. Wollstein, Vom Weimarer Revisionismus zu Hitler (Bonn, 1973); H. Hörling, ‘L’opinion française face à l’avènement d’Hitler au pouvoir’, Francia, 3 (1975), 584–641; G. L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany (Chicago, 1970), pp. 39, 144–5, 150. The former tendency among German historians to stress British readiness for concessions towards Hitler has found little sympathy with those who had worked through the British documents released under the thirty years rule. See especially W. N. Medlicott’s Preface to vol. xix (2nd series) of Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939 (London, 1982); Oswald Häuser, England und das Dritte Reich, vol. 2, 1936–1938 (Göttingen, 1982); and Newman, March 1939. ‘Containment’ appears to have been the dominant motive in British foreign policy towards Hitler.

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  26. Josef Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül 1935–1939 (Boppard, 1973); Hauser, England und das Dritte Reich.

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  27. Hitler in conversation with Count Ciano after receipt of the so-called ‘Eden dossier’, October 1936: ‘If they [i.e. the British] leave me another five years, so much the better’ (Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, London, 1948, pp. 56–7). When haranguing National Socialist party functionaries on 29 April 1937, Hitler said: ‘... we must only hope that this conflict [deemed inevitable, D.A.] will not happen today, but only in several years time, the later the better’. It might be useful to remember that Hitler was, and remained, convinced, as shown in Mein Kampf, that Britain had obeyed its long-term national interest in ‘causing’ the 1914–18 war.

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  28. There are a number of revealing observations on Hitler’s attitude towards an invasion of Britain (Operation Seel’ôwe) in Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England (Durham NC, 1960).

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  29. A. Tyrell, Vom ‘Trommler’ zum ‘Führer’ (Munich, 1975). If it is true that Hitler conceived his ‘ultimate foreign policy aims’ with their ‘global setting’ during the years 1919 and 1920 (Thies, Architekt, p. 188), then it becomes imperative to re-evaluate their programmatical relevance in the light of Hitler’s self-conceived role of a ‘drummer’ rather than a ‘leader’ at this stage.

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  30. See, among others, the verbatim transcript of Hitler’s conversation with David Lloyd George, in M. Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (London, 1966), pp. 197–211.

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  31. See n. 12 above.

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  32. Hitlers Zweites Buch (Stuttgart, 1961), pp. 123–32. Among the numerous publications of the 1920s dealing with ‘the American Menace’ and the prospect of an impending war between Britain and the US mention will only be made here of the German editions of J. M. Kenworthy’s Will Civilisation Crash? (1928) and Ludwell Denny’s American Conquers Britain (1930). The idea of American ‘racial superiority’ was promulgated by American anthropologists such as L. Stoddard and M. Grant whose writings were promptly translated into German. There is, moreover, a striking similarity between some relevant paragraphs in Hitler’s Second Book and an article first published in the North American Review (March/May 1926) and republished in German (Archiv für Politik und Geschichte, 4 (1926), 488–9). Cf. also H. F. K. Günther, Rassenkunde Europas (Munich, 1926), pp. 212–14, and — as an assessment of the Johnson Act with its racialist restriction on US immigration — Wilhelm Frick, Wir bauen das Dritte Reich (Oldenburg, 1934), p. 63.

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  33. Otto Strasser, Ministersessel oder Revolution? (Berlin, 1930), pp. 13–15. 24–5.

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  34. Mein Kampf, pp. 741–2. Hitler’s famous dictum ‘Germany will be a World Power or it will recede to naught’ (ibid.), often quoted in support of the ‘globalist’ view, should be read in conjunction with the generally overlooked sentence immediately following it: ‘For attaining World Power [Germany] needs a size commensurate with its importance and adequate for providing sustenance to its citizens’ (Mein Kampf, p. 742). This should remove any doubt that for Hitler ‘world power’ was not tantamount to ‘world dominion’. As for the dangers of a blockade, see C. J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission (Munich, 1960), p. 342.

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  35. ‘The German national interest requires an alliance with Britain because this is indispensable for a Nordic-Germanic hegemony over Europe and — in conjunction with a Nordic-Germanic America — over the world.’ (Strasser, Ministersessel oder Revolution?, p. 15).

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  36. See, in particular, H. Fischelmayer, Sandungsideologische Konzeptionen in Grossbritannien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1880–1914, PhD thesis (Erlangen, 1975), pp. 126–53, and H. W. Koch, Der Sozialdarwinismus (Munich, 1973); Koch, ‘Die Rolle des Sozialdarwinismus als Faktor im Zeitalter des neuen Imperialismus um die Jahrhundertwende’, Zeitschrift für Politik, 17 (1970), 51–70.

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  37. A. Speer, Spandauer Tagebücher (Berlin, 1975), pp. 221–2; A. Hitler: Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944. Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims, ed. by Werner Jochmann (Hamburg, 1980), p. 58 (‘It would be beneficial for the German people to have to fight a war every 15 or 20 years’) et passim. Even Hillgruber makes the point that ‘Hitler clung to his Social-Darwinist basic idea of the eternal struggle [italics are mine, D.A.] even at the height of his power’. (Preface to Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, vol. 1 (Frankfurt/Main, 1967), p. 19.)

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  38. Thies, Architekt, pp. 55–6.

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  39. ADAP D, I Nr 19, p. 25. For Hitler’s premonitions of death in 1937 see W. Maser, Adolf Hitler — Legende, Mythos, Wirklichkeit (Munich, 1975), pp. 374–5.

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  40. Under the impact of the German people’s ‘failure of nerve’ during the crisis of September 1938 and immediately following British propaganda initiatives Hitler ordered the German media to launch a large-scale campaign ‘for reinforcing German self-reliance’ (Zur Stärkung des deutschen Selbstbewusstseins). See Jutta Sywottek, Mobilmachung für den totalen Krieg (Opladen, 1976), pp. 162–80, and Aigner, Ringen, p. 333. It is in this context that Hitler’s statements and architectural projects of 1939 as quoted by Thies (Architekt, p. 95) should be evaluated.

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  41. See, for example, Weltmacht Deutschland (Schulungsdienst der Hitler-Jugend, Folge 1/1940 of September 1940).

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  42. See also L. de Jong, Die Deutsche Fünfte Kolonne im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1959).

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  43. No one has provided a more penetrating and more perceptive analysis of Hitler’s quandary in a war he could start but could not bring to an end short of total victory than Andreas Hillgruber (see n. 20 above). It is, for this reason, rather difficult to understand what useful purpose could be served by the concept of a Stufenplan as an explanatory model for Hitler’s moves in this war. There is an additional reason for being on guard against all rationalisations e eventu when viewing recent research on Hitler’s Jewish policy: U. D. Adams, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1974); K. A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz (Urbana, Ill., 1970); E. Ben Elissar, La diplomatie du IIIe Reich et les Juifs 1933–1939 (Paris, 1969).

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  1. University of Mannheim, Germany

    Dietrich Aigner

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H. W. Koch

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© 1985 D. Aigner

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Aigner, D. (1985). Hitler’s Ultimate Aims — A Programme of World Dominion?. In: Koch, H.W. (eds) Aspects of the Third Reich. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17891-9_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17891-9_8

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  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-35273-1

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